Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
Ivan Turchynov
USES
Backdoor
Ivan planted a PHP script that provided persistent backdoor access to PR Newswire’s network.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 123
Details
“He left a PHP script there that would give him backdoor access to this place”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17636–17712
Ivan Turchynov
USES
PHP code exploitation
Ivan exploited PHP code on the PR Newswire website to gain access to its servers.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 123
Details
“he was able to exploit this PHP code that was on the website to gain access to their servers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17517–17609
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
USES
Artemis
The SEC used Artemis, an analytics system, to detect suspicious trading patterns.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 123
Details
“the SEC has a secret weapon called Artemis”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22799–22841
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
lookalike domain
The perpetrators used a domain made to look similar to Quanta's actual domain.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“he probably registered a domain that was very similar to Quanta’s actual domain”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10053–10132
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
Evaldas Rimasauskas
The incident involved Evaldas Rimasauskas as the person who organized and carried out the scam.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“Evaldas had his fake invoice, his fake domain, and fake business all set up.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11350–11427
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
wire fraud
Evaldas pleaded guilty to wire fraud in connection with the scam.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“Evaldas pleaded guilty to wire fraud”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14990–15026
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
Quanta Computer
The scam impersonated Quanta Computer and redirected payments that were intended for it.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“he was going to pose as Quanta Computing and issue an invoice to Facebook to pay a bill”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8170–8257
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
Lithuania
The incident involved Lithuania because Evaldas lived there and was arrested by Lithuanian authorities.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“The Lithuanian authorities arrested Evaldas.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14888–14932
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
social engineering
The perpetrators used social engineering to gather information about Facebook and Google and their financial processes.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“they had to do it piece by piece and slowly social-engineer their way into the company”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5683–5769
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
Business E-mail Compromise
The scam used what the episode calls a Business E-mail Compromise, or BEC, scam.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“Evaldas took this a step further, conducting what’s called a BEC scam.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9141–9211
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI investigated the scam, froze funds, and gathered evidence after being notified by an employee.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“the employee notified the FBI, and with millions of dollars stolen, the FBI jumped right into action”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14464–14564
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
spoofed e-mails
The scam involved emails made to resemble messages from Quanta and sent to Facebook or Google employees.
Explicit
Confidence 90%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“We’re talking spoofed e-mails, spear phishing, malware attacks”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15584–15646
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
money laundering
The proceeds were moved through multiple bank accounts and countries as part of a money-laundering scheme.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“Evaldas would just send them fake legal documents that made it look like his money laundering scheme was just normal business dealings.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 12933–13068
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
INVOLVES
phishing
Jack characterizes BEC as a phishing attack in which the attacker poses as someone known to the victim.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“BEC is basically a phishing attack, but you’re posing as someone that the victim knows already.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9335–9430
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
TARGETS
Google
The scam also targeted Google, which was tricked into sending money to Evaldas instead of Quanta.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“he was able to trick someone at Google to send him money instead of Quanta”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11511–11585
Evaldas Rimasauskas BEC scam
TARGETS
Facebook
The scam targeted Facebook by diverting payments intended for Quanta into Evaldas's bank account.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“He put it together and sent the e-mail to the right person at Facebook”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10321–10391
Evaldas Rimasauskas
USES
lookalike domain
Evaldas allegedly registered a domain similar to Quanta's domain to make the fraudulent emails appear legitimate.
Uncertain
Confidence 86%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“my guess is he probably registered a domain that was very similar to Quanta’s actual domain”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10041–10132
Evaldas Rimasauskas
USES
social engineering
Evaldas and his team used social engineering to obtain information from Facebook, Google, and related companies.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“they had to do it piece by piece and slowly social-engineer their way into the company”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5683–5769
Evaldas Rimasauskas
USES
Business E-mail Compromise
Evaldas conducted a BEC scam to redirect corporate payments.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“Evaldas took this a step further, conducting what’s called a BEC scam.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9141–9211
Evaldas Rimasauskas
USES
WHOIS lookup
Investigators could use a WHOIS lookup to identify who registered and controlled the lookalike domain; the episode does not state that Evaldas used the tool himself.
Attributed
Confidence 35%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“To figure that out, you can do a WHOIS lookup on a domain.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14193–14251
Evaldas Rimasauskas
USES
money laundering
Evaldas used a system of moving money through accounts in multiple countries, described as money laundering.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 124
Details
“he had a whole system to clean the money, too”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 12396–12441
Jeremiah Roe
ASSOCIATED_WITH
BC
Jeremiah worked collaboratively with BC during the physical penetration test.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jeremiah Roe
EP 125
Details
“I was working with another individual. Call him BC. I was working with BC”
Jeremiah Roe ·
offsets 18561–18636
Jeremiah Roe
ASSOCIATED_WITH
OSCP
Jeremiah took and passed the OSCP certification, which the episode describes as testing hacking tools and exploitation techniques.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 125
Details
“eventually he took the OSCP certification”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8433–8474
unlocked workstation
DISCOVERED_BY
Jeremiah Roe
Jeremiah and his team found laptops left unlocked and open at employees' desks during the assessment.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jeremiah Roe
EP 125
Details
“individuals who had just kinda walked away from their laptops and left them unlocked and open at their desks”
Jeremiah Roe ·
offsets 23190–23291
Jeremiah Roe
MEMBER_OF
Synack
Jeremiah identifies himself as a solutions architect for Synack; Jack later says he moved to Synack to conduct offensive operations.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jeremiah Roe
EP 125
Details
“my name is Jeremiah Roe and I’m a solutions architect for Synack”
Jeremiah Roe ·
offsets 7496–7560