Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
JPMorgan Chase breach
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Andrei Tyurin
Andrei Tyurin later admitted to hacking eight US financial institutions, including JPMorgan Chase, as part of the broader scheme.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Andrei admitted to conspiracy to commit computer hacking”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 83928–83984
“These include JPMorgan Chase, Fidelity, Dow Jones, E-Trade, and Scottrade.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 84261–84335
JPMorgan Chase breach
COMPROMISES
Corporate Challenge
The Corporate Challenge charity website was hacked and breached in connection with the JPMorgan investigation.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Simmco Data dug around their network logs and confirmed that the Corporate Challenge website was hacked and breached.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6352–6469
JPMorgan Chase breach
COMPROMISES
JPMorgan Chase
The breach compromised JPMorgan Chase's network and customer databases.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“The biggest bank in America had been hacked and they never even knew it happened.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 7456–7537
Kelihos
DEVELOPED_BY
Peter Levashov
Peter Levashov was identified as the person who built the Kelihos botnet.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Peter was from St. Petersburg and he’s the one who built the Kelihos botnet”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 77416–77491
Todur
DEVELOPED_BY
Gery Shalon
Gery created the online payment-processing company Todur in 2011.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Gery created two online payment processing companies called IDPay and Todur.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 55314–55390
IDPay
DEVELOPED_BY
Gery Shalon
Gery created the online payment-processing company IDPay in 2011.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“In 2011, the same year he started the pump-and-dump scams, Gery created two online payment processing companies called IDPay and Todur.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 55255–55390
Webologic Ltd.
DEVELOPED_BY
Gery Shalon
Gery helped establish Webologic Ltd. in 2009.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“in 2009 they established a web marketing company called Webologic Ltd. Gery was the manager of this company”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26962–27070
Webologic Ltd.
DEVELOPED_BY
Ziv Orenstein
Ziv was one of the two men who established Webologic Ltd., although his formal involvement was not listed.
Explicit
Confidence 90%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“in 2009 they established a web marketing company called Webologic Ltd.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26962–27032
JPMorgan Chase breach
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
Corporate Challenge
Jack presents access through the Corporate Challenge site, possibly through its hosting provider, as one theory for how the attackers entered the bank's network.
Uncertain
Direction flagged
Confidence 84%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“it’s possible that the hacker gained access to this Corporate Challenge charity site. How? Possibly by hacking through Simmco Data Systems”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8215–8355
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
Simmco Data Systems
Simmco Data Systems was the hosting provider for the breached Corporate Challenge website and was itself reported as breached.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“It was hosted by a company called Simmco Data Systems. As it happened, Simmco Data Systems was also mentioned in the Hold Security report.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5839–5978
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
FBI
JPMorgan Chase contacted the FBI, which investigated the breach.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“At this point, JPMorgan Chase contacted the FBI”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 7539–7586
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
Data exfiltration
The attackers quietly accessed databases and exported data to their own servers for months.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“For months, these hackers had been creeping around, quietly accessing databases and exporting data to their own servers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11554–11673
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
spear phishing
Targeting a JPMorgan IT administrator through spear phishing is presented as an alternative theory for gaining access.
Uncertain
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“The other is that this hacker crew might have targeted an IT admin at JPMorgan Chase through spear phishing”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9127–9234
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
password reuse
Password reuse is presented as a possible mechanism by which credentials from the Corporate Challenge site could have enabled access to JPMorgan's network.
Uncertain
Confidence 92%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Maybe some of those username and passwords were the same usernames and passwords used to log into JPMorgan Chase’s network.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8739–8862
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
persistence
The hackers created a back door to maintain persistent access to the JPMorgan Chase network.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“The hackers created a back door into the JPMorgan Chase network.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11060–11124
JPMorgan Chase breach
INVOLVES
two-factor authentication
The neglected employee-benefits server lacked two-factor authentication, which Jack says probably would have stopped the attackers from progressing.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“This is a perfect example of when two-factor authentication probably would have stopped these hackers from getting any further into the network.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10620–10764
Gery Shalon
MEMBER_OF
Webologic Ltd.
Gery Shalon managed Webologic Ltd. and was described as its head of operations and CEO.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Gery was the manager of this company”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 27034–27070
“Gery was the head of operations and CEO of their company, Webologic.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38736–38804
Ziv Orenstein
MEMBER_OF
Webologic Ltd.
Ziv Orenstein was associated with the operation of Webologic and was described as the person really in charge despite not being listed officially.
Uncertain
Confidence 91%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“Ziv wasn’t listed as being involved with Webologic, at least on the books. Still, the Wall Street Journal reported that there were thirty odd employees that worked there and they all knew Ziv was really the guy in charge.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 27075–27297
RevenueJet
OPERATED_BY
Milore Ltd
RevenueJet was described as part of a group of casinos owned and operated by Milore Ltd.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“These are actually groups of casinos owned and operated by companies called Netad Management and Milore Ltd”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 45145–45252
Affactive
OPERATED_BY
Netad Management
Affactive was described as part of a group of casinos owned and operated by Netad Management.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“These are actually groups of casinos owned and operated by companies called Netad Management and Milore Ltd”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 45145–45252
John Doe
USES
Reverse shell
The unidentified hacker installed a reverse shell on an E-Trade server to maintain access and export data.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“he installed a reverse shell on it. Four days after that, he gained access to three more internal servers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 67170–67263
John Doe
USES
SEO poisoning
The hacker compromised dormant gambling-related WordPress blogs and added links and posts to improve the ranking of Gery's casinos.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“The hacker exploited a lot of these old WordPress blogs and he created tons of links to the casinos’ websites.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 70314–70424
John Doe
USES
distributed denial-of-service attack
Gery's hacker used a botnet to conduct denial-of-service attacks against competing gambling sites.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“The hacker would use a botnet to launch a huge denial-of-service attack on competitor casinos”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 71433–71526
Peter Levashov
USES
Kelihos
Peter Levashov operated the Kelihos botnet, which was used to send large volumes of spam email.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“He was accused of running the Kelihos botnet”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 77837–77881
Affactive
USES
Rival
Affactive's casinos used Rival gambling software for their games.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 76
Details
“all these sites under Affactive and RevenueJet used gambling software called Rival and RTG for the games.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 45694–45799