Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Litecoin-mining malware USES Command and control

Int80 says the malware's command and control was hosted on a VPS.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“the C2 was at some hosting company”

Int80 · offsets 46762–46796

Int80 USES Windows API

Int80 says he learned the Windows API to write programs that could kick people offline.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“learning Visual Basic and the Windows API so that I could write my own punters”

Int80 · offsets 41044–41122

YTCracker USES Website defacement

YTCracker describes replacing or modifying website pages as a form of web page defacement.

Explicit Confidence 99% · YTCracker EP 78 Details

“I kind of really liked web page defacement”

YTCracker · offsets 9744–9786

Ohm-I USES .NET payloads

Ohm-I describes using .NET payloads while developing a web shell for a penetration test.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 78 Details

“writing .NET payloads”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33116–33137

YTCracker USES bulletin board system

YTCracker says his first real hack involved accessing a public library bulletin board system.

Explicit Confidence 97% · YTCracker EP 78 Details

“the public library had a bulletin board system”

YTCracker · offsets 3034–3080

Litecoin-mining malware USES VPS

Int80 says the malware's C2 was on a VPS in a hosting provider's environment.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“this malware has got its C2 on a VPS in your hosting setup”

Int80 · offsets 46855–46913

Litecoin-mining malware USES Litecoin

The malware mined Litecoin and used a Litecoin mining pool.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“I reached out to the Litecoin mining pool”

Int80 · offsets 46285–46326

YTCracker USES AOL

YTCracker describes using AOL systems and chatrooms to identify and intimidate users.

Explicit Confidence 96% · YTCracker EP 78 Details

“We were working on defacing keywords. We had access to the CRIS.”

YTCracker · offsets 7168–7233

YTCracker USES IRC

Jack describes the Eggdrop installation as an IRC bot.

Derived Confidence 93% · Jack Rhysider EP 78 Details

“He installed an IRC bot on it”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 3262–3291

Litecoin-mining malware USES Dropbox

Int80 says the malware staged files on Dropbox.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“the malware had stages up on Dropbox”

Int80 · offsets 46546–46582

Ohm-I USES web shell

Ohm-I says he wrote a web shell to obtain command-line access and take over a machine.

Explicit Confidence 93% · Jack Rhysider EP 78 Details

“writing .NET payloads and all these other cool things”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33116–33169

Int80 USES black-box assessment

Int80 says his application-security consulting engagements included black-box assessments.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“We would do white box or black box assessments”

Int80 · offsets 42642–42688

Ohm-I USES Red Team

Ohm-I says he works on an internal red team performing assessments against Azure product teams.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 78 Details

“Our job is to perform red team assessments against teams working on Azure products and services.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36047–36143

YTCracker USES Consumer Resource Information Service

YTCracker says he and others had access to AOL's Consumer Resource Information Service to look up user information.

Explicit Confidence 99% · YTCracker EP 78 Details

“We had access to the CRIS. It was the Consumer Resource Information Service”

YTCracker · offsets 7207–7283

YTCracker USES Eggdrop bot

YTCracker says he dropped into a shell on a bulletin board system and turned it into an Eggdrop bot.

Explicit Confidence 99% · YTCracker EP 78 Details

“I found out how to drop into a shell. I turned it into an Eggdrop bot.”

YTCracker · offsets 3083–3154

Int80 USES malware analysis

Int80 describes sandboxing malware, picking it apart, and determining what it was doing.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Int80 EP 78 Details

“sandbox it, pick it apart programatically, figure out what it was doing”

Int80 · offsets 45672–45743

Kroll ASSOCIATED_WITH Wirecard AG

Kroll investigators visited Matthew Earl on behalf of Wirecard regarding his research into the company.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“The two men let him know that they were there on behalf of Wirecard”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7981–8048

Dark Basin ASSOCIATED_WITH BellTroX InfoTech Services

The episode presents circumstantial evidence linking Dark Basin’s phishing activity to BellTroX InfoTech Services, rather than asserting a fully proven operational identity.

Uncertain Confidence 86% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“He was relieved when the Citizen Lab report came out linking the phishing to BellTroX”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 54990–55075

BellTroX InfoTech Services ASSOCIATED_WITH Hack-for-hire

The episode portrays BellTroX as potentially operating as a hack-for-hire or mercenary hacking organization, while retaining some uncertainty about the full scope of its activity.

Uncertain Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“Was that real activity being Dark Basin a massive hack-for-hire mercenary outfit?”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 38759–38840

Dark Basin ASSOCIATED_WITH India

The timing, code, URL-shortener names, logs, and test IP addresses were suggestive of operators working out of India, but the episode notes that the timezone could have been falsified.

Uncertain Confidence 84% · Adam Hulcoop EP 79 Details

“each piece was another little bread crumb suggesting operators working out of India”

Adam Hulcoop · offsets 35718–35801

ShadowFall Capital Research ASSOCIATED_WITH Wirecard AG

ShadowFall Capital Research investigated Wirecard AG as a potential short-selling target.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“Back in 2015, Matthew started watching a German payment company called Wirecard AG.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 2999–3082

Jones Day ASSOCIATED_WITH Wirecard AG

Jones Day represented Wirecard and sent Matthew Earl a letter concerning his research and alleged conduct.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“It was from Jones Day, a law firm representing Wirecard.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8073–8129

Dark Basin DISCOVERED_BY Citizen Lab

Citizen Lab investigated the phishing infrastructure and named the hacking group Dark Basin.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 79 Details

“Dark Basin was what Citizen Lab named this hacking group.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19083–19140

Sumit Gupta MEMBER_OF BellTroX InfoTech Services

Sumit Gupta was identified as the owner of BellTroX and was also listed as being with the company under the alias Sumit Vishnoi.

Explicit Confidence 98% · John Scott-Railton EP 79 Details

“The owner of BellTroX has been indicted and charged”

John Scott-Railton · offsets 39987–40038

“His profile says he’s with BellTroX”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 44246–44281

Matthew Earl MEMBER_OF ShadowFall Capital Research

Matthew Earl identifies himself as the managing partner of ShadowFall Capital Research.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Matthew Earl EP 79 Details

“My name is Matthew Earl. I’m the managing partner of ShadowFall Capital Research.”

Matthew Earl · offsets 2216–2298