Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack INVOLVES TeaMp0isoN

TeaMp0isoN was reported as having jammed the UK counter-terrorism hotline with computer-generated calls.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Host6 EP 109 Details

“TeaMp0isoN is an anarchist, hacktivist group, and it began by jamming the UK’s counter-terrorism hotline”

Host6 · offsets 34233–34337

Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack INVOLVES PBX

TriCk compromised a PBX server based in the Philippines as part of the Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“He compromised a PBX server that was based in the Philippines”

MLT · offsets 33087–33148

Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack INVOLVES Asterisk

Asterisk was used to script the repeated calls against the Anti-Terrorist Hotline.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“he wrote a script using Asterisk”

MLT · offsets 33159–33191

Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack INVOLVES DDoS

The Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack was a denial-of-service attack using repeated computer-generated calls.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“it’s a denial-of-service against the anti-terror hotline”

MLT · offsets 33488–33544

Anti-Terrorist Hotline attack INVOLVES caller ID spoofing

The attack spoofed caller IDs in a loop and generated different caller IDs repeatedly.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“spoofed caller IDs in a loop and randomly generated the caller IDs”

MLT · offsets 33199–33265

MLT MEMBER_OF TeaMp0isoN

MLT joined TeaMp0isoN and was asked to co-lead the group.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“I was one of those people. Then he went around to ask if I wanted to help co-lead the group with him.”

MLT · offsets 10809–10911

TriCk MEMBER_OF TeaMp0isoN

TriCk founded and led TeaMp0isoN after converting poison.org into the hacker group.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“TriCk wanted to take it up a notch and decided to convert his poison.org website into a hacker group called TeaMp0isoN.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10574–10693

TriCk MEMBER_OF ISIS

After moving to Syria, Junaid Hussain joined ISIS.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“Junaid Hussain had joined ISIS, a terrorist organization”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 44111–44167

MLT MEMBER_OF 0xffff

MLT is the founder and an active member of the 0xffff hacking group.

Derived Confidence 90% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“recently started a new hacking group called 0xffff”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 53558–53608

Sally Jones MEMBER_OF ISIS

Sally Jones went to Syria, reunited with Junaid, and was described as participating in ISIS activities.

Derived Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“Sally Jones decided to go to Syria, too”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43453–43492

TeaMp0isoN TARGETS BlackBerry

TeaMp0isoN targeted BlackBerry because it cooperated with police during the London riots by providing BBM-user information.

Explicit Confidence 98% · MLT EP 109 Details

“As a result, TriCk decided to attack BlackBerry.”

MLT · offsets 24902–24950

Junaid Hussain drone-strike incident TARGETS TriCk

The later US drone strike targeted and killed Junaid Hussain in Syria.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“Junaid Hussain was killed on August 25, 2015”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 49703–49747

TeaMp0isoN TARGETS English Defense League

TeaMp0isoN members targeted the English Defense League, including its website and donor database.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“The first major hack that I did with TriCk was the English Defense League.”

MLT · offsets 6580–6654

TeaMp0isoN USES social engineering

TeaMp0isoN used telephone social engineering while impersonating Google employees.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“We called them all up, pretending to be from Google”

MLT · offsets 25634–25685

TriCk USES malicious APK

According to an uncertain rumor relayed by MLT, someone tricked Junaid into downloading a malicious APK to obtain his location.

Uncertain Confidence 76% · MLT EP 109 Details

“someone tricked him into downloading a malicious APK file onto his Android phone”

MLT · offsets 48514–48594

TeaMp0isoN USES WordPress

After compromising employee Gmail accounts, the attackers used the WordPress password-reset process to access the BlackBerry blog.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“this BlackBerry blog was just a WordPress site”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 26397–26443

TeaMp0isoN USES password reset attack

The attackers requested Gmail password resets and persuaded employees to disclose the received security codes.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“we’d just do a password reset request on their Gmail account”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36170–36230

MLT USES bug bounty hunting

MLT said he spent about five years doing bug bounty hunting.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“I was doing a lot of bug bounty hunting”

MLT · offsets 51741–51780

MLT USES exploit development

MLT shifted from bug bounty hunting to zero-day exploit development and selling the resulting exploits.

Explicit Confidence 99% · MLT EP 109 Details

“I’ve kinda shifted my focus recently to zero-day exploit development”

MLT · offsets 51843–51911

TeaMp0isoN USES phishing

TeaMp0isoN used a phishing email as the initial access method in the hotel compromise involving P. Diddy.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“to get into this hotel’s network, it started with a phishing e-mail”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 21954–22021

TeaMp0isoN USES Website defacement

Website defacement was an early objective of TeaMp0isoN's attacks.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 109 Details

“Their early objectives were simply to try to deface their target websites.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 11370–11444

SpamIt ASSOCIATED_WITH Glavmed

Damon McCoy's analysis concluded that SpamIt was a fork of the Glavmed databases and that both programs were operated by the same people.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Damon McCoy EP 110 Details

“SpamIt is just a fork of the Glavmed databases and that in fact, these two are operated by the same people.”

Damon McCoy · offsets 56303–56410

Rustock ATTRIBUTED_TO Cosma

Rustock is attributed directly to Cosma as its main botmaster.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 110 Details

“Cosma, Rustock’s main botmaster”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 66545–66576

ChronoPay DEVELOPED_BY Igor Gusev

Igor Gusev set up ChronoPay with Pavel Vrublevsky in 2003.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 110 Details

“he had set up a payment processor in Russia with his business partner at the time, Pavel Vrublevsky. They called it ChronoPay”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6449–6575

ChronoPay DEVELOPED_BY Pavel Vrublevsky

Pavel Vrublevsky was Igor Gusev's business partner in setting up ChronoPay.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 110 Details

“with his business partner at the time, Pavel Vrublevsky. They called it ChronoPay”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6493–6575