Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Retail credit-card breach INVOLVES lateral movement

After gaining network access, the attackers moved to other machines and propagated through the environment.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 15 Details

“When the hacker is in the network, they can move over to another machine to start setting up their malware.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 16168–16275

Matt Bromiley MEMBER_OF Kroll

Matt was part of the Kroll incident-response team during the investigation.

Explicit Confidence 95% · Jack Rhysider EP 15 Details

“Let’s meet two of the members of that team.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 2837–2880

“My name is Matt Bromiley.”

Matt Bromiley · offsets 2959–2984

Matt Bromiley MEMBER_OF Cylance

Matt later moved from Kroll to Cylance.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 15 Details

“Matt has since moved from Kroll and is now working at Cylance”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 29157–29218

Courtney Dayter MEMBER_OF Kroll

Courtney was one of the Kroll incident-response team members working on the case.

Explicit Confidence 95% · Jack Rhysider EP 15 Details

“Let’s meet two of the members of that team.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 2837–2880

“My name’s Courtney Dayter. I’m a Senior Managing Consultant.”

Courtney Dayter · offsets 2891–2952

Tiny POS USES Data exfiltration

The malware pushed scraped data over the network to central repository or clearing-house systems.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Matt Bromiley EP 15 Details

“it pushes that data over the wire to the central repository system”

Matt Bromiley · offsets 6635–6701

“Malware was directly writing over the wire right to these systems”

Matt Bromiley · offsets 10491–10556

Kroll USES Carbon Black

Kroll’s incident-response team primarily used Carbon Black for endpoint monitoring and analysis across the environment.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Matt Bromiley EP 15 Details

“The tool that we use primarily is Carbon Black which is an end-point monitoring tool”

Matt Bromiley · offsets 3755–3839

Tiny POS USES XOR

The malware’s output files were encrypted using XOR.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 15 Details

“The output files were encrypted using XOR”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7837–7878

Tiny POS USES Memory scraping

The card-scraping malware scraped payment-card data from memory.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Courtney Dayter EP 15 Details

“The way that they were scraping cards were – they were scraping from memory.”

Courtney Dayter · offsets 8207–8283

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release CONTAINS encryption key

The incident involved Eijah finding and publicly releasing an HD DVD/Blu-ray processing or decryption key.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“This was the key that would allow someone to decrypt a Blu-ray movie and make a copy of it.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 12641–12732

Demon Saw DEVELOPED_BY Eijah

Jack says Demon Saw is one of two projects Eijah created himself.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“Eijah is currently working on two projects he created himself; Demon Saw and Promether.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28163–28250

Promether DEVELOPED_BY Eijah

Jack says Promether is one of two projects Eijah created himself.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“Eijah is currently working on two projects he created himself; Demon Saw and Promether.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28163–28250

AACS DEVELOPED_BY Advanced Access Control System Licensing Administrator

The episode identifies the AACS LA as the organization that created the encryption used on HD DVDs and Blu-ray discs.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“The company that created the encryption is the Advanced Access Control System Licensing Administrator”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6703–6804

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release DISCOVERED_BY Eijah

The incident concerns the decryption key that Eijah derived while analyzing the protection system.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“Eijah ... find the encryption key”

Eijah · offsets 7900–7940

“maybe that’s the key. Could that actually be the key?”

Eijah · offsets 12448–12502

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release INVOLVES Doom9

Eijah posted the encryption key on the Doom9 hacker forum.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“He decided to post the encryption key he found on a popular hacker forum called Doom9.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 14874–14960

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release INVOLVES HD DVD

The episode describes the key as the first publicly released decryption key for HD DVD and Blu-ray discs.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“the very first decryption key ever made public for the HD DVD and Blu-ray discs”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15835–15914

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release INVOLVES Sony

The release was expected to damage movie distributors such as Sony, and Eijah says he wanted to affect Sony.

Explicit Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“it would likely damage movie distributors like Sony, which is what he wanted”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 14567–14643

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release INVOLVES Blu-ray

The released key was described as enabling decryption of Blu-ray movies.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“the key that would allow someone to decrypt a Blu-ray movie”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 12650–12709

HD DVD/Blu-ray decryption key release LEADS_TO The Pirate Bay

Jack describes a chain in which the key enabled ripping software, which led to copied movies being distributed through torrent sites such as The Pirate Bay.

Derived Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 16 Details

“Then they post and distribute the movies to torrent sites like The Pirate Bay”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 20112–20189

Eijah MEMBER_OF American Express

Eijah says that in 2007 he was responsible for American Express’s security portfolio.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I was in charge of American Express’ security portfolio.”

Eijah · offsets 1590–1646

Eijah MEMBER_OF Rockstar

Eijah says he was a lead programmer for Grand Theft Auto V with Rockstar.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I was one of the lead programmers for Grand Theft Auto V for five years with Rockstar.”

Eijah · offsets 24996–25082

Eijah USES Xbox HD DVD Drive

Eijah bought and connected an Xbox HD DVD Drive to his computer.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I got curious and decided to buy one. I spent $300 and I plugged it in”

Eijah · offsets 2612–2683

Eijah USES C and C++

Eijah switched from Java to a C and C++ utility pipeline to obtain raw memory access.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I actually switched to a C and C++ utility pipeline just to be able to have raw access to the memory”

Eijah · offsets 9447–9547

Eijah USES memory scanning

One of Eijah’s utilities scanned memory for patterns while attempting to recover the key.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“Another one would scan memory, look for pattern.”

Eijah · offsets 9684–9732

Eijah USES Xbox 360

Eijah used an Xbox 360 with the HD DVD Drive to watch HD DVD content.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I had an Xbox 360 which, by the way, was a great gaming console. Somebody told me about this little-known peripheral called the Xbox HD DVD Drive. I got curious and decided to buy one. I spent $300 and I plugged it in and I could watch my video on – through my Xbox 360.”

Eijah · offsets 2463–2736

Eijah USES Java

Eijah says he was a Java programmer while developing his decryption utilities.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Eijah EP 16 Details

“I was a Java programmer at that time”

Eijah · offsets 9251–9287