Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
Dark Caracal
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Lebanon
Jack says there are clues suggesting that the Lebanese government is somehow behind Dark Caracal, while noting that the group's identity is not certain.
Uncertain
Confidence 88%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“there are quite a bit of clues that lead us to believe that the Lebanese government is somehow behind this Dark Caracal group”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17948–18073
The D.R. Incident
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Dark Caracal
The campaign was associated with Dark Caracal in the investigation, but the episode emphasizes that attribution was not clear.
Uncertain
Confidence 72%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“it was not just Dark Caracal; it was not just Conti”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 29528–29579
“This attribution wasn’t exactly clear”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 33666–33703
Conti
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Russia
Jack says Conti has been widely attributed to Russia.
Attributed
Confidence 91%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“Conti has been widely-attributed to be from Russia”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22780–22830
The D.R. Incident
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Russia
Omar says his partners told him Russia was involved in the Dominican Republic campaign, but he also presents the attribution as uncertain and based on what they learned during the investigation.
Uncertain
Confidence 72%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“they told us that it was not just Dark Caracal; it was not just Conti, but also it was — Russia was also involved”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 29510–29623
The D.R. Incident
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
phishing
The investigation found that the attackers entered the network through a phishing attack.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“the attackers got into the network via a phishing attack”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 11980–12036
Costa Rica ransomware attack
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
phishing
The Costa Rica campaign infected departments through phishing emails as well as other internet-connected systems.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“They were attacking government organizations through phishing”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 4981–5042
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
Conti
The Dominican Republic campaign included Conti-related command-and-control activity and staged Conti ransomware, although the ransomware was stopped before execution.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 22477–22538
“they seemed to have stopped the Conti ransomware attack before it actually triggered ransomware on any systems”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 36742–36852
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
operational technology
The campaign reached critical infrastructure, but the attackers could not disrupt the operational technology controlling it.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“They tried to but they could not. The critical infrastructure works — what we call the OT, which is operational technology”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 37144–37266
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
Fortinet firewall vulnerability
The Quantum attackers exploited a Fortinet firewall vulnerability to obtain VPN access to the infrastructure.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“They exploited a vulnerability, a Fortinet firewall that allowed them to have VPN access to the infrastructure”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 10700–10810
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
Quantum ransomware
The Dominican Republic agricultural department suffered a ransomware attack attributed in the report to the Quantum ransomware group.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Host2
EP 135
Details
“The Dominican Republic’s agricultural department has suffered a ransomware attack by the Quantum ransomware group”
Host2 ·
offsets 9871–9984
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
Bandook
Hundreds of phishing emails contained or used Bandook as the attackers' backdoor.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“all of them had a backdoor the attackers were using, which was a backdoor known as Bandook”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17780–17868
Costa Rica ransomware attack
INVOLVES
Conti
Twenty Costa Rican government organizations were hit with Conti ransomware.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“twenty different government organizations in Costa Rica were hit with this Conti ransomware”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4523–4614
The D.R. Incident
INVOLVES
Cobalt Strike
A compromised system downloaded Cobalt Strike, and a later Cobalt Strike implant communicated with Conti's command-and-control infrastructure.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“a system did get infected and it reached out to the command and control server to download Cobalt Strike”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15514–15618
“they now downloaded or installed a second malware, which was a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 22416–22538
Omar Avilez
MEMBER_OF
Dominican Republic National CSIRT
Omar says he used to work in the Dominican Republic National CSIRT.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“I used to work in the Dominican Republic National CSIRT”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 3769–3824
Conti
USES
command and control server
A command-and-control server was utilized by Conti to control infected systems.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“a C2 server that was utilized by Conti”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 14699–14737
Cobalt Strike
USES
command and control server
The Cobalt Strike implant communicated with Conti's command-and-control server.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 22477–22538
Dominican Republic National CSIRT
USES
DNS
The Dominican Republic CSIRT implemented a tool to analyze DNS queries across government organizations for visibility into network activity.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Omar Avilez
EP 135
Details
“we got a tool to analyze all the DNS queries that the organization made”
Omar Avilez ·
offsets 13658–13729
Dominican Republic National CSIRT
USES
Threat intelligence
The CSIRT used threat intelligence by comparing observed domains against known malicious domains.
Explicit
Confidence 95%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 135
Details
“This is called threat intelligence”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14143–14177
Joy-Con paperclip glitch
AFFECTS
Nintendo Switch
The Joy-Con paperclip glitch allowed a Switch to boot into recovery mode and access diagnostic tools.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 136
Details
“you could then get it to boot into recovery mode and have access to diagnostic tools”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 48724–48808
PCSX
AFFECTS
PlayStation Classic
The PlayStation Classic used the PCSX emulator, with Sony adding its own interface around it.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 136
Details
“The mini PlayStation used the PCSX emulator”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 42297–42340
Steam publication workflow bypass
AFFECTS
Steam
The exploit bypassed Steam's game publication and review workflow.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 136
Details
“they were able to send data to Steam saying the game is currently published”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 2035–2110
Gary Bowser
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Team Xecuter
Gary described himself as a PR and intermediary figure for Team Xecuter, not a developer.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Gary Bowser
EP 136
Details
“I was never on the actual development side of doing the actual exploits of the coding.”
Gary Bowser ·
offsets 54379–54465
George Hotz
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Sony
Sony pursued legal action against George Hotz after he publicly posted the PlayStation 3 root key.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Gary Bowser
EP 136
Details
“Sony cracked down hard. They went after geohot”
Gary Bowser ·
offsets 34530–34576
Team Xecuter
ASSOCIATED_WITH
MAXiMiLiEN
MAXiMiLiEN bought the Team Xecuter branding, website, and supply chain from Paul Owen, making him closely associated with the group.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 136
Details
“The Team Xecuter branding, the website, the supply chain, everything was sold to MAXiMiLiEN.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38262–38354
Classic 2 Magic
DEVELOPED_BY
Team Xecuter
The Classic 2 Magic was described as a Team Xecuter product sold under a different brand.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 136
Details
“Both of these products were by Team Xecuter, but they were selling it under a different brand”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 43843–43936