Episode

EP 135 — The D.R. Incident

04 July 2023 Official episode · Official transcript

advanced persistent threat cybercrime incident response

The episode describes a coordinated 2022 cyber campaign affecting Dominican Republic government agencies, critical infrastructure, and a bank, involving Bandook, Dark Caracal, Cobalt Strike, and Conti-related activity, with attribution to Russia and other actors presented as uncertain.

Topics: Ransomware campaigns, Phishing and spearphishing, Privilege escalation, Zero-day vulnerabilities, Fortinet firewall exploitation, VPN access, Command and control infrastructure, Cobalt Strike, Bandook backdoor, DNS monitoring, Threat intelligence, Indicators of compromise, Incident response, Operational technology, Attribution uncertainty, Network detection and response, Pyramid of pain

Official episode-page sources

Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.

Entities (35)

Claims (21)

Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.

Omar Avilez MEMBER_OF Dominican Republic National CSIRT

Omar says he used to work in the Dominican Republic National CSIRT.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“I used to work in the Dominican Republic National CSIRT”

Omar Avilez · offsets 3769–3824

Dominican Republic National CSIRT ASSOCIATED_WITH FIRST

The Dominican Republic CSIRT participates in the FIRST incident-response community and uses it to connect with other teams for assistance.

Explicit Confidence 91% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“FIRST is a forum for incident response”

Omar Avilez · offsets 25013–25051

Costa Rica ransomware attack INVOLVES Conti

Twenty Costa Rican government organizations were hit with Conti ransomware.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“twenty different government organizations in Costa Rica were hit with this Conti ransomware”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4523–4614

Costa Rica ransomware attack INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The Costa Rica campaign infected departments through phishing emails as well as other internet-connected systems.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“They were attacking government organizations through phishing”

Omar Avilez · offsets 4981–5042

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES Quantum ransomware

The Dominican Republic agricultural department suffered a ransomware attack attributed in the report to the Quantum ransomware group.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Host2 EP 135 Details

“The Dominican Republic’s agricultural department has suffered a ransomware attack by the Quantum ransomware group”

Host2 · offsets 9871–9984

The D.R. Incident INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The investigation found that the attackers entered the network through a phishing attack.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“the attackers got into the network via a phishing attack”

Omar Avilez · offsets 11980–12036

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES Fortinet firewall vulnerability

The Quantum attackers exploited a Fortinet firewall vulnerability to obtain VPN access to the infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“They exploited a vulnerability, a Fortinet firewall that allowed them to have VPN access to the infrastructure”

Omar Avilez · offsets 10700–10810

Fortinet firewall vulnerability AFFECTS Fortinet firewall

The vulnerability affected a Fortinet firewall and enabled VPN access.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“a vulnerability, a Fortinet firewall that allowed them to have VPN access”

Omar Avilez · offsets 10715–10788

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES Bandook

Hundreds of phishing emails contained or used Bandook as the attackers' backdoor.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“all of them had a backdoor the attackers were using, which was a backdoor known as Bandook”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 17780–17868

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES Cobalt Strike

A compromised system downloaded Cobalt Strike, and a later Cobalt Strike implant communicated with Conti's command-and-control infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“a system did get infected and it reached out to the command and control server to download Cobalt Strike”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15514–15618

“they now downloaded or installed a second malware, which was a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”

Omar Avilez · offsets 22416–22538

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES Conti

The Dominican Republic campaign included Conti-related command-and-control activity and staged Conti ransomware, although the ransomware was stopped before execution.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”

Omar Avilez · offsets 22477–22538

“they seemed to have stopped the Conti ransomware attack before it actually triggered ransomware on any systems”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36742–36852

Conti USES command and control server

A command-and-control server was utilized by Conti to control infected systems.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“a C2 server that was utilized by Conti”

Omar Avilez · offsets 14699–14737

Cobalt Strike USES command and control server

The Cobalt Strike implant communicated with Conti's command-and-control server.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“a Cobalt Strike implant which was communicating to Conti’s C2”

Omar Avilez · offsets 22477–22538

Bandook ASSOCIATED_WITH Dark Caracal

Jack says Bandook has been known to be used by Dark Caracal, but presents the connection as suggestive rather than certain.

Uncertain Confidence 91% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“the Bandook malware has been known to be used by a group called Dark Caracal”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 17775–17851

Dark Caracal ASSOCIATED_WITH Lebanon

Jack says there are clues suggesting that the Lebanese government is somehow behind Dark Caracal, while noting that the group's identity is not certain.

Uncertain Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“there are quite a bit of clues that lead us to believe that the Lebanese government is somehow behind this Dark Caracal group”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 17948–18073

Conti ATTRIBUTED_TO Russia

Jack says Conti has been widely attributed to Russia.

Attributed Confidence 91% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“Conti has been widely-attributed to be from Russia”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 22780–22830

The D.R. Incident ATTRIBUTED_TO Russia

Omar says his partners told him Russia was involved in the Dominican Republic campaign, but he also presents the attribution as uncertain and based on what they learned during the investigation.

Uncertain Confidence 72% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“they told us that it was not just Dark Caracal; it was not just Conti, but also it was — Russia was also involved”

Omar Avilez · offsets 29510–29623

The D.R. Incident ATTRIBUTED_TO Dark Caracal

The campaign was associated with Dark Caracal in the investigation, but the episode emphasizes that attribution was not clear.

Uncertain Confidence 72% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“it was not just Dark Caracal; it was not just Conti”

Omar Avilez · offsets 29528–29579

“This attribution wasn’t exactly clear”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33666–33703

Dominican Republic National CSIRT USES DNS

The Dominican Republic CSIRT implemented a tool to analyze DNS queries across government organizations for visibility into network activity.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“we got a tool to analyze all the DNS queries that the organization made”

Omar Avilez · offsets 13658–13729

Dominican Republic National CSIRT USES Threat intelligence

The CSIRT used threat intelligence by comparing observed domains against known malicious domains.

Explicit Confidence 95% · Jack Rhysider EP 135 Details

“This is called threat intelligence”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 14143–14177

The D.R. Incident INVOLVES operational technology

The campaign reached critical infrastructure, but the attackers could not disrupt the operational technology controlling it.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Omar Avilez EP 135 Details

“They tried to but they could not. The critical infrastructure works — what we call the OT, which is operational technology”

Omar Avilez · offsets 37144–37266

Transcript references

Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.

Extraction provenance

Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19 · 2026-09-13T07:56:50.306609+00:00