Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Iran
Some security researchers believed the attack was retaliation from Iran for Stuxnet, but the episode presents this as a theory rather than a confirmed attribution.
Uncertain
Confidence 78%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“some security researchers believe this was a retaliation from Iran because of the Stuxnet attack”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 30074–30170
Chris Kubecka
AUTHORED
Hack the World with Osint
Chris Kubecka authored the book Hack the World with Osint.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“her newest one which should be out in a few days, is called Hack the World with Osint”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 36036–36121
Chris Kubecka
AUTHORED
Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey
Chris Kubecka authored the book Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“Her first one is called Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 35968–36030
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
COMPROMISES
Saudi Aramco
The 2012 attack struck Saudi Aramco and gave the attackers administrative access to its network.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“Saudi Aramco. You may not ever have heard of Saudi Aramco before and neither did I until I started researching this story and that’s because they don’t sell to consumers. Instead they sell to manufacturers and distributors so what do they do? Saudi Aramco is one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in the world. It controls massive amounts of oil reserves. It drills it and ships it all over the world. Saudi Aramco may be the most profitable company in existence and produces 25% of the global oil. It’s not a publically trading company though, so we really don’t know how much it’s worth. Because Saudi Aramco is huge and operating globally, it has a lot of computers.
There are pump stations, plants, shipping terminals, logistics centers, laboratories, research and development centers, and storage facilities. Let’s not forget the teams it takes to run it. There’s an HR department, IT department, marketing, truck drivers, mechanics, engineers, public relations, finance, drilling teams, and advisors. Add all that up and Saudi Aramco has over 50,000 employees. Imagine how many computers there are at a company that has 50,000 employees. Not only do a lot of them have individual computers to work on but there’s a lot of servers; domain controllers, e-mail servers, SharePoint systems, files servers, and more. In 2012 Saudi Aramco had over 40,000 computers in their network worldwide. Now I say 2012 because that was when the most profitable company in the world was hit with the most devastating cyber-attack any company has ever seen.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 1327–2897
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
phishing
The attackers likely gained initial access through a phishing e-mail.
Uncertain
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“The attackers likely got in through a phishing e-mail.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4628–4682
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
exploit of unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities
The suspected phishing attachment could exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat installations.
Derived
Confidence 90%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“the file would attempt to exploit one of these known vulnerabilities to gain access to the computer”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5205–5304
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
default usernames and passwords
Attackers briefly regained access because some perimeter security appliances retained default usernames and passwords.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Chris Kubecka
EP 30
Details
“had left some of the stuff with default usernames and passwords on the network and security appliances”
Chris Kubecka ·
offsets 26501–26603
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
lateral movement
After gaining access, the attackers moved around the network with ease.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“When the attackers got into Saudi Aramco, they were able to move around with ease.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5381–5463
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
Domain controller
The attackers focused on domain controllers and obtained administrative privileges on them.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“The attackers focused on these domain controllers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5753–5802
“the attackers had access to Saudi Aramco’s network and had administrative privileges to the domain controllers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6099–6209
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
Shamoon
The attack involved the Shamoon wiper virus.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“This wiper virus would be known as the Shamoon virus.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9276–9329
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
flat network
Saudi Aramco's flat network allowed access from one part of the network to other parts.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“because their network was flat, once you got into any part of the network you could get to anything, anywhere”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4228–4337
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
INVOLVES
distributed denial-of-service attack
During the later attacks, the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against Saudi Aramco.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Chris Kubecka
EP 30
Details
“the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against them”
Chris Kubecka ·
offsets 26224–26281
Chris Kubecka
MEMBER_OF
Saudi Aramco
Chris Kubecka accepted a role with Saudi Aramco after it called and hired her to ramp up its security.
Explicit
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“Chris took the job and got right to work building her team.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 19994–20053
Shamoon
RELATED_TO
Stuxnet
Security researchers linked Shamoon's Saudi Aramco attack as possible retaliation for Stuxnet; this relationship is presented as uncertain.
Uncertain
Confidence 75%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“this was a retaliation from Iran because of the Stuxnet attack that hit their nuclear facilities”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 30108–30204
Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)
SAME_AS
Shamoon Attacks 1
The episode explicitly identifies the Saudi Aramco incident as Shamoon Attacks 1.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“This incident with Saudi Aramco is known as the Shamoon Attacks 1.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 32447–32513
Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3
TARGETS
Saudi Aramco
Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 were described as ongoing against Saudi Aramco.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Chris Kubecka
EP 30
Details
“There’s now Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 that are still ongoing against Saudi Aramco”
Chris Kubecka ·
offsets 32521–32600
Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3
TARGETS
Saudi Arabia
Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 were described as ongoing attacks against Saudi Arabia, especially its critical infrastructure and airports.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Chris Kubecka
EP 30
Details
“There’s now Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 that are still ongoing against Saudi Aramco and Saudi Arabia, especially hitting Saudi Arabian critical infrastructures”
Chris Kubecka ·
offsets 32521–32676
Shamoon
TARGETS
Saudi Aramco
Shamoon targeted Saudi Aramco's computer systems, wiping approximately 35,000 of them.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 30
Details
“35,000 computers had become completely unusable all at the same time.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9832–9901
Shamoon
USES
logic bomb
Shamoon was described as a logic bomb set to trigger at a particular time and day.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Chris Kubecka
EP 30
Details
“It was a logic bomb set to go off at a particular time on a particular day.”
Chris Kubecka ·
offsets 9337–9412
Universal Plug and Play
AFFECTS
Chromecast
UPnP was described as a reason Chromecasts could be exposed to the internet.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 31
Details
“These Chromecasts were also exposed to the internet because of UPnP.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 45680–45748
Printer Exploitation Toolkit
AFFECTS
network printer
PRET can connect to network printers and perform actions including printing, listing files, and resetting the printer.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Hacker Giraffe
EP 31
Details
“this tool can connect and you can do all kinds of things like list the files, reset the printer”
Hacker Giraffe ·
offsets 17332–17427
Universal Plug and Play
AFFECTS
Google Home Device
The episode places Google Home devices among devices whose ports could be exposed through router configuration involving UPnP.
Derived
Confidence 90%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 31
Details
“Apparently Google Home Devices were also opening up this port and they had an API, too.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 47176–47263
internet-exposed printer
AFFECTS
network printer
Internet-exposed printers can receive print commands from anywhere; port 9100 had no authentication or encryption in the described setup.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 31
Details
“There’s no authentication or encryption; you simply send your PDF file to the port with the command to print”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 16474–16582
Universal Plug and Play
AFFECTS
network printer
UPnP can cause routers to open printer ports to the public internet, exposing network printers.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 31
Details
“networked devices like printers can reach out to the router and request that port 9100 be opened”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 32950–33046
Hacker Giraffe
ASSOCIATED_WITH
User
Hacker Giraffe collaborated with User on the later printer and Chromecast operations.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Hacker Giraffe
EP 31
Details
“We came together after seeing a few articles came out”
Hacker Giraffe ·
offsets 40804–40857