Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) ATTRIBUTED_TO Iran

Some security researchers believed the attack was retaliation from Iran for Stuxnet, but the episode presents this as a theory rather than a confirmed attribution.

Uncertain Confidence 78% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“some security researchers believe this was a retaliation from Iran because of the Stuxnet attack”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 30074–30170

Chris Kubecka AUTHORED Hack the World with Osint

Chris Kubecka authored the book Hack the World with Osint.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“her newest one which should be out in a few days, is called Hack the World with Osint”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36036–36121

Chris Kubecka AUTHORED Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey

Chris Kubecka authored the book Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“Her first one is called Down the Rabbit Hole, an Osint Journey”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 35968–36030

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) COMPROMISES Saudi Aramco

The 2012 attack struck Saudi Aramco and gave the attackers administrative access to its network.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“Saudi Aramco. You may not ever have heard of Saudi Aramco before and neither did I until I started researching this story and that’s because they don’t sell to consumers. Instead they sell to manufacturers and distributors so what do they do? Saudi Aramco is one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in the world. It controls massive amounts of oil reserves. It drills it and ships it all over the world. Saudi Aramco may be the most profitable company in existence and produces 25% of the global oil. It’s not a publically trading company though, so we really don’t know how much it’s worth. Because Saudi Aramco is huge and operating globally, it has a lot of computers. There are pump stations, plants, shipping terminals, logistics centers, laboratories, research and development centers, and storage facilities. Let’s not forget the teams it takes to run it. There’s an HR department, IT department, marketing, truck drivers, mechanics, engineers, public relations, finance, drilling teams, and advisors. Add all that up and Saudi Aramco has over 50,000 employees. Imagine how many computers there are at a company that has 50,000 employees. Not only do a lot of them have individual computers to work on but there’s a lot of servers; domain controllers, e-mail servers, SharePoint systems, files servers, and more. In 2012 Saudi Aramco had over 40,000 computers in their network worldwide. Now I say 2012 because that was when the most profitable company in the world was hit with the most devastating cyber-attack any company has ever seen.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 1327–2897

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The attackers likely gained initial access through a phishing e-mail.

Uncertain Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“The attackers likely got in through a phishing e-mail.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4628–4682

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA exploit of unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities

The suspected phishing attachment could exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat installations.

Derived Confidence 90% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“the file would attempt to exploit one of these known vulnerabilities to gain access to the computer”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5205–5304

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES default usernames and passwords

Attackers briefly regained access because some perimeter security appliances retained default usernames and passwords.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“had left some of the stuff with default usernames and passwords on the network and security appliances”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 26501–26603

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES lateral movement

After gaining access, the attackers moved around the network with ease.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“When the attackers got into Saudi Aramco, they were able to move around with ease.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5381–5463

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES Domain controller

The attackers focused on domain controllers and obtained administrative privileges on them.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“The attackers focused on these domain controllers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5753–5802

“the attackers had access to Saudi Aramco’s network and had administrative privileges to the domain controllers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6099–6209

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES Shamoon

The attack involved the Shamoon wiper virus.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“This wiper virus would be known as the Shamoon virus.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 9276–9329

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES flat network

Saudi Aramco's flat network allowed access from one part of the network to other parts.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“because their network was flat, once you got into any part of the network you could get to anything, anywhere”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4228–4337

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES distributed denial-of-service attack

During the later attacks, the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against Saudi Aramco.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against them”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 26224–26281

Chris Kubecka MEMBER_OF Saudi Aramco

Chris Kubecka accepted a role with Saudi Aramco after it called and hired her to ramp up its security.

Explicit Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“Chris took the job and got right to work building her team.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19994–20053

Shamoon RELATED_TO Stuxnet

Security researchers linked Shamoon's Saudi Aramco attack as possible retaliation for Stuxnet; this relationship is presented as uncertain.

Uncertain Confidence 75% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“this was a retaliation from Iran because of the Stuxnet attack that hit their nuclear facilities”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 30108–30204

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) SAME_AS Shamoon Attacks 1

The episode explicitly identifies the Saudi Aramco incident as Shamoon Attacks 1.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“This incident with Saudi Aramco is known as the Shamoon Attacks 1.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 32447–32513

Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 TARGETS Saudi Aramco

Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 were described as ongoing against Saudi Aramco.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“There’s now Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 that are still ongoing against Saudi Aramco”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 32521–32600

Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 TARGETS Saudi Arabia

Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 were described as ongoing attacks against Saudi Arabia, especially its critical infrastructure and airports.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“There’s now Shamoon Attacks 2 and 3 that are still ongoing against Saudi Aramco and Saudi Arabia, especially hitting Saudi Arabian critical infrastructures”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 32521–32676

Shamoon TARGETS Saudi Aramco

Shamoon targeted Saudi Aramco's computer systems, wiping approximately 35,000 of them.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“35,000 computers had become completely unusable all at the same time.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 9832–9901

Shamoon USES logic bomb

Shamoon was described as a logic bomb set to trigger at a particular time and day.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“It was a logic bomb set to go off at a particular time on a particular day.”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 9337–9412

Universal Plug and Play AFFECTS Chromecast

UPnP was described as a reason Chromecasts could be exposed to the internet.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 31 Details

“These Chromecasts were also exposed to the internet because of UPnP.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 45680–45748

Printer Exploitation Toolkit AFFECTS network printer

PRET can connect to network printers and perform actions including printing, listing files, and resetting the printer.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Hacker Giraffe EP 31 Details

“this tool can connect and you can do all kinds of things like list the files, reset the printer”

Hacker Giraffe · offsets 17332–17427

Universal Plug and Play AFFECTS Google Home Device

The episode places Google Home devices among devices whose ports could be exposed through router configuration involving UPnP.

Derived Confidence 90% · Jack Rhysider EP 31 Details

“Apparently Google Home Devices were also opening up this port and they had an API, too.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 47176–47263

internet-exposed printer AFFECTS network printer

Internet-exposed printers can receive print commands from anywhere; port 9100 had no authentication or encryption in the described setup.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 31 Details

“There’s no authentication or encryption; you simply send your PDF file to the port with the command to print”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 16474–16582

Universal Plug and Play AFFECTS network printer

UPnP can cause routers to open printer ports to the public internet, exposing network printers.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 31 Details

“networked devices like printers can reach out to the router and request that port 9100 be opened”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 32950–33046

Hacker Giraffe ASSOCIATED_WITH User

Hacker Giraffe collaborated with User on the later printer and Chromecast operations.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Hacker Giraffe EP 31 Details

“We came together after seeing a few articles came out”

Hacker Giraffe · offsets 40804–40857