Incident

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012)

incident:saudi_aramco_cyber_attack_2012 Also: Saudi Aramco attack, the attack

The 2012 destructive cyber-attack that rendered approximately 35,000 Saudi Aramco systems unusable and forced the company offline.

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Relationships

Direction Predicate Other entity Origin EP
outgoing COMPROMISES Saudi Aramco Explicit 30
outgoing INVOLVES Shamoon Explicit 30
outgoing INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing Uncertain 30
outgoing INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA exploit of unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities Derived 30
outgoing INVOLVES flat network Explicit 30
outgoing INVOLVES lateral movement Explicit 30
outgoing INVOLVES Domain controller Explicit 30
outgoing INVOLVES distributed denial-of-service attack Explicit 30
outgoing INVOLVES default usernames and passwords Explicit 30
outgoing ASSOCIATED_WITH The Cutting Sword of Justice Explicit 30
outgoing ATTRIBUTED_TO Iran Attributed 30
outgoing ATTRIBUTED_TO Iran Uncertain 30
outgoing SAME_AS Shamoon Attacks 1 Explicit 30

Claims

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) COMPROMISES Saudi Aramco

The 2012 attack struck Saudi Aramco and gave the attackers administrative access to its network.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“Saudi Aramco. You may not ever have heard of Saudi Aramco before and neither did I until I started researching this story and that’s because they don’t sell to consumers. Instead they sell to manufacturers and distributors so what do they do? Saudi Aramco is one of the largest oil and natural gas producers in the world. It controls massive amounts of oil reserves. It drills it and ships it all over the world. Saudi Aramco may be the most profitable company in existence and produces 25% of the global oil. It’s not a publically trading company though, so we really don’t know how much it’s worth. Because Saudi Aramco is huge and operating globally, it has a lot of computers. There are pump stations, plants, shipping terminals, logistics centers, laboratories, research and development centers, and storage facilities. Let’s not forget the teams it takes to run it. There’s an HR department, IT department, marketing, truck drivers, mechanics, engineers, public relations, finance, drilling teams, and advisors. Add all that up and Saudi Aramco has over 50,000 employees. Imagine how many computers there are at a company that has 50,000 employees. Not only do a lot of them have individual computers to work on but there’s a lot of servers; domain controllers, e-mail servers, SharePoint systems, files servers, and more. In 2012 Saudi Aramco had over 40,000 computers in their network worldwide. Now I say 2012 because that was when the most profitable company in the world was hit with the most devastating cyber-attack any company has ever seen.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 1327–2897

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES Shamoon

The attack involved the Shamoon wiper virus.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“This wiper virus would be known as the Shamoon virus.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 9276–9329

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The attackers likely gained initial access through a phishing e-mail.

Uncertain Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“The attackers likely got in through a phishing e-mail.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4628–4682

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA exploit of unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat vulnerabilities

The suspected phishing attachment could exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat installations.

Derived Confidence 90% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“the file would attempt to exploit one of these known vulnerabilities to gain access to the computer”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5205–5304

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES flat network

Saudi Aramco's flat network allowed access from one part of the network to other parts.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“because their network was flat, once you got into any part of the network you could get to anything, anywhere”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4228–4337

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES lateral movement

After gaining access, the attackers moved around the network with ease.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“When the attackers got into Saudi Aramco, they were able to move around with ease.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5381–5463

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES Domain controller

The attackers focused on domain controllers and obtained administrative privileges on them.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“The attackers focused on these domain controllers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5753–5802

“the attackers had access to Saudi Aramco’s network and had administrative privileges to the domain controllers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6099–6209

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES distributed denial-of-service attack

During the later attacks, the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against Saudi Aramco.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“the attackers launched a massive DDoS attack against them”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 26224–26281

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) INVOLVES default usernames and passwords

Attackers briefly regained access because some perimeter security appliances retained default usernames and passwords.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“had left some of the stuff with default usernames and passwords on the network and security appliances”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 26501–26603

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) ASSOCIATED_WITH The Cutting Sword of Justice

The Pastebin warnings connected with the attack were signed by The Cutting Sword of Justice; the transcript does not establish that the group conducted the attack.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“The Pastebin was signed by someone calling themselves The Cutting Sword of Justice”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8346–8428

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) ATTRIBUTED_TO Iran

The Saudi Arabian government attributed the attack to Iran.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Chris Kubecka EP 30 Details

“According to the Saudi Arabian government, it was the country of Iran.”

Chris Kubecka · offsets 29746–29816

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) ATTRIBUTED_TO Iran

Some security researchers believed the attack was retaliation from Iran for Stuxnet, but the episode presents this as a theory rather than a confirmed attribution.

Uncertain Confidence 78% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“some security researchers believe this was a retaliation from Iran because of the Stuxnet attack”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 30074–30170

Saudi Aramco cyber-attack (2012) SAME_AS Shamoon Attacks 1

The episode explicitly identifies the Saudi Aramco incident as Shamoon Attacks 1.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 30 Details

“This incident with Saudi Aramco is known as the Shamoon Attacks 1.”