Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
Tinker Secor
USES
physical intrusion
Tinker physically entered the IT room after finding its door propped open and removed laptops for testing.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“I walk in real quick and I see stacks and stacks of laptops.”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 43060–43120
“I start taking armloads, like full handfuls of these laptops to my cubicle”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 44440–44514
Tinker Secor
USES
password spraying
Tinker performed a targeted password spray against workstations using recovered usernames and passwords.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“I do a very targeted spray with their username and their password against all of it.”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 26374–26458
Tinker Secor
USES
exfiltration
Tinker lists exfiltration as a possible phase of his penetration-testing methodology.
Explicit
Confidence 95%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“exfiltration, and persistence may be in there if you need to”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 7908–7968
Tinker Secor
USES
Hashcat
Tinker used Hashcat to try billions of password guesses against captured hashes.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 36
Details
“Then he runs a tool called Hashcat to cycle through billions of passwords”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22413–22486
Tinker Secor
USES
Responder
Tinker ran Responder to induce systems on the local subnet to disclose Net-NTLM authentication hashes.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 36
Details
“The next day he comes in, fires up Responder”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 18827–18871
“I will run Responder twice a day”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 21279–21311
Tinker Secor
USES
Ubuntu
Tinker says his personal hacking laptop used Ubuntu as its base image.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“loaded with Ubuntu as a base image”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 9753–9787
Tinker Secor
USES
Reconnaissance
Tinker describes password, active, and environmental reconnaissance as part of his standard approach.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“Get in and do password reconnaissance, active reconnaissance”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 7701–7761
Tinker Secor
USES
Metasploit
Tinker used Metasploit to listen for and manage the reverse-shell connection from the compromised finance computer.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 36
Details
“He pulls Metasploit up and waits and watches.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 55311–55356
Tinker Secor
USES
PowerShell
Tinker used PowerShell in a reverse-shell payload delivered to another workstation.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“He wrote an executable that will then call my PowerShell, reverse shell.”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 51935–52007
Tinker Secor
USES
Wireshark
Tinker used Wireshark to sniff packets and identify hardware and host naming patterns.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“the first thing I did is run Wireshark”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 15390–15428
“started trapping a lot of – sniffing a lot of the packets”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 15896–15953
Tinker Secor
USES
Veil
Tinker says the PowerShell remote-shell payload was a tweaked version of Veil or a similar PowerShell tool.
Uncertain
Confidence 90%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“I think it was just a tweaked version of Veil or some sort of PowerShell, remote shell.”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 52009–52096
Tinker Secor
USES
Kali Linux
Tinker brought a Kali image on USB and had Kali virtual machines on his rogue laptop.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“a Kali image burnt on a USB”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 9634–9661
“loaded with Ubuntu as a base image with some Kali VMs”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 9753–9806
Tinker Secor
USES
brute-force password cracking
Tinker used brute-force password cracking against captured authentication hashes.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 36
Details
“This is brute force password-cracking.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22830–22868
Tinker Secor
USES
Citrix
Tinker targeted Citrix because he expected it to provide access to hosted internal applications or servers.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Tinker Secor
EP 36
Details
“One thing caught my eye though, in the single sign-on, was Citrix.”
Tinker Secor ·
offsets 32929–32995
wiper virus
AFFECTS
Microsoft Windows
The wiper virus targeted Windows machines and wiped the Windows Active Directory server in Las Vegas.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“targeting just Windows machines”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 23010–23041
“the wiper virus hit the active directory server in Las Vegas and completely wiped it out”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 23217–23305
Stuxnet
ATTRIBUTED_TO
United States
Jack states that Stuxnet was a US attack on Iranian soil.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“Stuxnet was a US attack on Iranian soil”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 27066–27105
Moonlight Maze
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Russia
Jack describes Moonlight Maze as Russia hacking into a US Air Force base.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“an attack called Moonlight Maze which was Russia hacking into a US Air Force base”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26765–26846
Sony cyber-attack
ATTRIBUTED_TO
North Korea
James Clapper identifies a North Korean attack against Sony in November 2014.
Attributed
Confidence 98%
· James Clapper
EP 37
Details
“and a North Korean attack against Sony in November”
James Clapper ·
offsets 25653–25703
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Iranian government
James Clapper attributed the attack against Las Vegas Sands to Iran; Jack presents this as an official attribution to the Iranian government or military, while noting the broader circumstances and motives were uncertain.
Attributed
Confidence 97%
· James Clapper
EP 37
Details
“2014 saw for the first time destructive cyber-attacks carried out on [00:25:00] US soil by nation state entities marked first by the Iranian attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation”
James Clapper ·
offsets 25435–25629
“James Clapper is saying that the people who did it was the Iranian government itself”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26027–26111
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
COMPROMISES
Las Vegas Sands
The cyber-attack compromised Las Vegas Sands' networks, servers, and data and caused extensive operational damage.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“The attack on Las Vegas Sands wiped out almost 75% of the company’s networks and servers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 27728–27816
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
INVOLVES
lateral movement
After compromising one server, the attackers attempted to move laterally and escalate privileges across the network.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“you now need to figure out how to laterally move or escalate your privileges”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 16544–16620
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
INVOLVES
credential dumping
The attackers harvested usernames and clear-text passwords from the web development server using Mimikatz.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“they were able to see the usernames and passwords of web developers and IT admins for Sands Bethlehem”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17538–17639
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
INVOLVES
wiper virus
The attack involved a custom-written Visual Basic wiper code intended to destroy data and spread through the network.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“a wiper code with the goal of destruction”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 19288–19329
“This wiper virus was on a mission to infect and spread to as many systems as it could and delete the data”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22884–22989
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
INVOLVES
two-factor authentication
The Sands security team enabled two-factor authentication for VPN users to prevent the password attack from succeeding.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“They enabled two factor authentication for VPN users”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15576–15628
Las Vegas Sands cyber-attack
INVOLVES
Sands Bethlehem
The cyber-attack began with activity against the Sands Bethlehem network and its internet-facing systems.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 37
Details
“the IT team in the Sands [00:15:00] Bethlehem resort saw some worrying activity on their computer network”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14518–14623