Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

NotPetya ATTRIBUTED_TO GRU

The Washington Post was credited with reporting before the official announcement that NotPetya was carried out by the GRU.

Attributed Confidence 90% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“the Washington Post who, in a story before that announcement, said simply that NotPetya was carried out by the GRU.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 46075–46190

Andy Greenberg AUTHORED Sandworm

Andy Greenberg says he is the author of the book Sandworm.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“I’m Andy Greenberg and I’m a senior writer for Wired Magazine and I’m the author of this book, Sandworm.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 2065–2169

Mimikatz DEVELOPED_BY Benjamin Delpy

Benjamin Delpy built Mimikatz to extract usernames and passwords from memory.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“He built a tool to extract this username and password to display it to anyone who wants to see it. That tool he made is called Mimikatz”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5235–5371

EternalBlue EXPLOITS SMB vulnerability

EternalBlue exploited a vulnerability in the Server Message Block function.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“EternalBlue which exploited a vulnerability in a Windows function called Server Message Block”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 8651–8744

NotPetya INVOLVES EternalBlue

The episode describes EternalBlue being used by the NotPetya worm to spread to computers without stolen passwords.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“if it couldn’t login like that, it would then try to use EternalBlue to see if that system was unpatched and exploit it that way”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10626–10754

NotPetya INVOLVES supply-chain compromise

The incident used a supply-chain compromise involving the MeDoc software update mechanism.

Derived Confidence 96% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“they hijacked MeDoc’s update mechanism to push out their own malware”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 12721–12789

Sandworm POSSIBLY_SAME_AS Fancy Bear

The episode presents Sandworm and Fancy Bear as possibly the same group, but explicitly says this is not known.

Uncertain Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“It might be the same group as Fancy Bear. We don’t know.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 47032–47089

NotPetya RELATED_TO wiper

Incident responders and security researchers characterized NotPetya as a destructive wiper posing as ransomware rather than genuine ransomware.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“It was a destructive worm posing as ransomware.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 16238–16285

“security researchers were suggesting that this isn’t a ransomware; it’s a wiper”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 32693–32772

NotPetya TARGETS Linkos Group

The attackers selected Linkos Group and its MeDoc update infrastructure as the initial point for targeting Ukraine.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“They ultimately chose to target a small company called Linkos Group.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 11622–11690

NotPetya TARGETS Maersk

NotPetya infected and severely disrupted Maersk's global network and operations.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“That was all that it took for Maersk’s entire global network to be infected.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 24885–24961

NotPetya TARGETS Merck

Merck was among the multinational companies infected by NotPetya.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“That included FedEx, Maersk, the world’s largest [00:20:00] shipping firm, Merck”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 17957–18037

NotPetya TARGETS Ukraine

The stated target was Ukraine, including its businesses and government agencies, with the goal of taking down as many Ukrainian computers as possible.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“the target of this attack was Ukraine and the goal was to take out as many computers as possible in Ukraine; businesses, government agencies, doesn’t matter.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 11135–11292

NotPetya TARGETS FedEx

FedEx was among the western companies hit by NotPetya.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“That included FedEx, Maersk, the world’s largest [00:20:00] shipping firm, Merck”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 17957–18037

NotPetya TARGETS Oschadbank

NotPetya hit approximately ninety percent of Oschadbank's computers and shut down its systems.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“Around ninety percent of all of the computers in Oschadbank had been hit with this mysterious ransomware worm.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 14770–14880

NotPetya USES Mimikatz

The episode says the hackers used Mimikatz to obtain credentials and help the worm spread through networks.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“the hackers used a tool called Mimikatz”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4295–4334

NotPetya USES EternalBlue

The worm used EternalBlue as an additional way to enter unpatched computers.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“another tool was added to this worm, something called EternalBlue”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8023–8088

NotPetya USES MeDoc

NotPetya was distributed by hijacking MeDoc's update mechanism and pushing malware through it.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 54 Details

“they hijacked MeDoc’s update mechanism to push out their own malware. Everyone everywhere in the world who had MeDoc installed suddenly has NotPetya”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 12721–12870

NotPetya USES ransomware

The episode says ransomware was used as the destructive mechanism, even though the attackers were not believed to be seeking money.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“Their goal was to destroy computers and ransomware was just the perfect tool to do that.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 6913–7001

NotPetya VARIANT_OF Petya

NotPetya was initially thought to be Petya, but further research identified it as a new strain; the name NotPetya stuck.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 54 Details

“It was originally thought to be Petya but some additional research went into it and found this is a new strain. It was not Petya.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 16549–16679

NoirNet Diaries DEVELOPED_BY Jack Rhysider

Jack states that he makes the show.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 55 Details

“This show is made by me”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 13501–13524

NoirNet Diaries REFERENCES Jeremy from Marketing

The episode references the earlier Episode 36 story titled “Jeremy from Marketing.”

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 55 Details

“You might remember him from an earlier episode called Jeremy from Marketing.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 623–699

“Look for Episode 36, Jeremy from Marketing.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 13329–13372

Yagix USES Eaphammer

Yagix obtains domain credentials from the target's WPA2 enterprise wireless network using Eaphammer.

Explicit Confidence 99% · TinkerSecure EP 55 Details

“He snagged domain creds from their WPA2 enterprise wireless network by using Eaphammer.”

TinkerSecure · offsets 12676–12763

TinkerSecure USES Proxmark

TinkerSecure uses a Proxmark to replay an access credential at the CISO office door.

Explicit Confidence 99% · TinkerSecure EP 55 Details

“The Proxmark changed from sniffing to replaying.”

TinkerSecure · offsets 12296–12344

TinkerSecure USES Tailgating

TinkerSecure gains entry by following employees through secured doors.

Derived Confidence 99% · TinkerSecure EP 55 Details

“her friend held the door open for me. I smiled and said thank you, and walked into the secured area”

TinkerSecure · offsets 9082–9182

TinkerSecure USES badge cloning

TinkerSecure uses badge replay/cloning to open a secured door.

Derived Confidence 94% · TinkerSecure EP 55 Details

“I waved my bag by the badge reader by the door and heard it click open.”

TinkerSecure · offsets 11800–11880