Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
NotPetya
ATTRIBUTED_TO
GRU
The Washington Post was credited with reporting before the official announcement that NotPetya was carried out by the GRU.
Attributed
Confidence 90%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“the Washington Post who, in a story before that announcement, said simply that NotPetya was carried out by the GRU.”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 46075–46190
Andy Greenberg
AUTHORED
Sandworm
Andy Greenberg says he is the author of the book Sandworm.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“I’m Andy Greenberg and I’m a senior writer for Wired Magazine and I’m the author of this book, Sandworm.”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 2065–2169
Mimikatz
DEVELOPED_BY
Benjamin Delpy
Benjamin Delpy built Mimikatz to extract usernames and passwords from memory.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“He built a tool to extract this username and password to display it to anyone who wants to see it. That tool he made is called Mimikatz”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5235–5371
EternalBlue
EXPLOITS
SMB vulnerability
EternalBlue exploited a vulnerability in the Server Message Block function.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“EternalBlue which exploited a vulnerability in a Windows function called Server Message Block”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 8651–8744
NotPetya
INVOLVES
EternalBlue
The episode describes EternalBlue being used by the NotPetya worm to spread to computers without stolen passwords.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“if it couldn’t login like that, it would then try to use EternalBlue to see if that system was unpatched and exploit it that way”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10626–10754
NotPetya
INVOLVES
supply-chain compromise
The incident used a supply-chain compromise involving the MeDoc software update mechanism.
Derived
Confidence 96%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“they hijacked MeDoc’s update mechanism to push out their own malware”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 12721–12789
Sandworm
POSSIBLY_SAME_AS
Fancy Bear
The episode presents Sandworm and Fancy Bear as possibly the same group, but explicitly says this is not known.
Uncertain
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“It might be the same group as Fancy Bear. We don’t know.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 47032–47089
NotPetya
RELATED_TO
wiper
Incident responders and security researchers characterized NotPetya as a destructive wiper posing as ransomware rather than genuine ransomware.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“It was a destructive worm posing as ransomware.”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 16238–16285
“security researchers were suggesting that this isn’t a ransomware; it’s a wiper”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 32693–32772
NotPetya
TARGETS
Linkos Group
The attackers selected Linkos Group and its MeDoc update infrastructure as the initial point for targeting Ukraine.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“They ultimately chose to target a small company called Linkos Group.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11622–11690
NotPetya
TARGETS
Maersk
NotPetya infected and severely disrupted Maersk's global network and operations.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“That was all that it took for Maersk’s entire global network to be infected.”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 24885–24961
NotPetya
TARGETS
Merck
Merck was among the multinational companies infected by NotPetya.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“That included FedEx, Maersk, the world’s largest [00:20:00] shipping firm, Merck”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 17957–18037
NotPetya
TARGETS
Ukraine
The stated target was Ukraine, including its businesses and government agencies, with the goal of taking down as many Ukrainian computers as possible.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“the target of this attack was Ukraine and the goal was to take out as many computers as possible in Ukraine; businesses, government agencies, doesn’t matter.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11135–11292
NotPetya
TARGETS
FedEx
FedEx was among the western companies hit by NotPetya.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“That included FedEx, Maersk, the world’s largest [00:20:00] shipping firm, Merck”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 17957–18037
NotPetya
TARGETS
Oschadbank
NotPetya hit approximately ninety percent of Oschadbank's computers and shut down its systems.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“Around ninety percent of all of the computers in Oschadbank had been hit with this mysterious ransomware worm.”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 14770–14880
NotPetya
USES
Mimikatz
The episode says the hackers used Mimikatz to obtain credentials and help the worm spread through networks.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“the hackers used a tool called Mimikatz”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4295–4334
NotPetya
USES
EternalBlue
The worm used EternalBlue as an additional way to enter unpatched computers.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“another tool was added to this worm, something called EternalBlue”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8023–8088
NotPetya
USES
MeDoc
NotPetya was distributed by hijacking MeDoc's update mechanism and pushing malware through it.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Andy Greenberg
EP 54
Details
“they hijacked MeDoc’s update mechanism to push out their own malware. Everyone everywhere in the world who had MeDoc installed suddenly has NotPetya”
Andy Greenberg ·
offsets 12721–12870
NotPetya
USES
ransomware
The episode says ransomware was used as the destructive mechanism, even though the attackers were not believed to be seeking money.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“Their goal was to destroy computers and ransomware was just the perfect tool to do that.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6913–7001
NotPetya
VARIANT_OF
Petya
NotPetya was initially thought to be Petya, but further research identified it as a new strain; the name NotPetya stuck.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 54
Details
“It was originally thought to be Petya but some additional research went into it and found this is a new strain. It was not Petya.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 16549–16679
NoirNet Diaries
DEVELOPED_BY
Jack Rhysider
Jack states that he makes the show.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 55
Details
“This show is made by me”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 13501–13524
NoirNet Diaries
REFERENCES
Jeremy from Marketing
The episode references the earlier Episode 36 story titled “Jeremy from Marketing.”
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 55
Details
“You might remember him from an earlier episode called Jeremy from Marketing.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 623–699
“Look for Episode 36, Jeremy from Marketing.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 13329–13372
Yagix
USES
Eaphammer
Yagix obtains domain credentials from the target's WPA2 enterprise wireless network using Eaphammer.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· TinkerSecure
EP 55
Details
“He snagged domain creds from their WPA2 enterprise wireless network by using Eaphammer.”
TinkerSecure ·
offsets 12676–12763
TinkerSecure
USES
Proxmark
TinkerSecure uses a Proxmark to replay an access credential at the CISO office door.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· TinkerSecure
EP 55
Details
“The Proxmark changed from sniffing to replaying.”
TinkerSecure ·
offsets 12296–12344
TinkerSecure
USES
Tailgating
TinkerSecure gains entry by following employees through secured doors.
Derived
Confidence 99%
· TinkerSecure
EP 55
Details
“her friend held the door open for me. I smiled and said thank you, and walked into the secured area”
TinkerSecure ·
offsets 9082–9182
TinkerSecure
USES
badge cloning
TinkerSecure uses badge replay/cloning to open a secured door.
Derived
Confidence 94%
· TinkerSecure
EP 55
Details
“I waved my bag by the badge reader by the door and heard it click open.”
TinkerSecure ·
offsets 11800–11880