Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
LinkedIn data breach
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Yevgeniy Nikulin
Yevgeniy Nikulin was associated with the LinkedIn breach through multiple investigative trails, and the jury later found him guilty on all nine counts involving LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Formspring.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“The jury found him guilty on all nine counts”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 47813–47857
Kislitsin
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Yevgeniy Nikulin
Kislitsin provided information to the FBI identifying Yevgeniy as the person behind the Dropbox and Formspring activity; the association is based on Kislitsin's attributed statement.
Attributed
Confidence 91%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he told them that Yevgeniy Nikulin was the person who broke into Dropbox”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38274–38346
Formspring breach
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Yevgeniy Nikulin
Kislitsin also said that Yevgeniy had the Formspring data with the goal of selling database dumps for money; this relationship is attributed to Kislitsin's statement.
Attributed
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“and had the Formspring [00:40:00] data, all with the goal to sell the database dumps on the black market for money”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38374–38488
Dropbox breach
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Yevgeniy Nikulin
Kislitsin told the FBI that Yevgeniy Nikulin was the person who broke into Dropbox and still had access to it; this is an attributed account, not an independently stated fact in the episode.
Attributed
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he told them that Yevgeniy Nikulin was the person who broke into Dropbox and still had access to it”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38274–38373
Dropbox breach
COMPROMISES
Dropbox
Dropbox confirmed unauthorized access to its corporate network and later determined that user details had been stolen.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“Once Dropbox did confirm there was unauthorized access into the network”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 22645–22716
Formspring breach
COMPROMISES
Formspring
The Formspring incident involved unauthorized access to the server and theft of user information.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“Formspring had no idea they were breached”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26595–26636
LinkedIn data breach
COMPROMISES
LinkedIn
The incident was a breach of LinkedIn's network and user database.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“LinkedIn had just been breached but they didn’t know it yet”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9865–9924
LinkedIn data breach
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
VPN
The hacker gained direct access to LinkedIn through an employee's VPN profile and credentials.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“connected directly into LinkedIn’s VPN server”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9261–9306
Formspring breach
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
SSH
The hacker obtained Formspring administrator credentials and logged into the server using SSH.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“the hacker got one of the admin usernames and passwords from Formspring’s server and logged in using SSH”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 25385–25489
Dropbox breach
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
credential reuse
The hacker appears to have entered Dropbox using a reused password belonging to a Dropbox engineer; Jack is uncertain whether the same password was used at Dropbox.
Uncertain
Confidence 89%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“But did this engineer use the same password where he worked too, at Dropbox? I don’t know for sure but the hacker was able to login as the engineer at Dropbox.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 20698–20858
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
Password hash cracking
The stolen LinkedIn password hashes were posted for help cracking, and the hacker later used cracked passwords to access accounts.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“the hacker wanted to find a way to crack these passwords”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 12770–12826
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
Public-key authentication
The hacker stole the engineer's private key, which was used for public-key authentication to LinkedIn systems.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he found a private key to LinkedIn”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8240–8274
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
virtual machine escape
After compromising a virtual machine, the hacker escaped to the iMac host computer through the virtual IP interface.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“the hacker got into the virtual machine and then got into the host computer from there”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 7777–7863
Formspring breach
INVOLVES
madnez.php
The hacker installed madnez.php on the Formspring server to maintain access.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“He was able to install a malicious program called madnez.php on the server so that he could get back in anytime he wanted”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 25656–25777
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
cockeyed.com
The hacker used access to cockeyed.com, hosted at the engineer's residence, as a path toward the engineer's computer and LinkedIn access.
Explicit
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“The hacker got shell access to the website cockeyed.com”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6439–6494
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
brute-force password attack
The hacker brute-forced the iMac login by trying thousands of passwords against a guessed username.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he just started hammering away, trying thousands and thousands of passwords”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6942–7017
Dropbox breach
INVOLVES
credential reuse
The Dropbox engineer acknowledged reusing the same password across several personal accounts, enabling the hacker to access additional accounts.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“His Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Google accounts all had the same password”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 20533–20611
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
User-agent fingerprinting
Investigators used the hacker's distinctive user agent to correlate activity across IP addresses and services.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“if there was a matching user agent, then you could know that that’s probably the same person”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 16182–16274
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
Sputnik user agent
The hacker's user agent included the unusual string Sputnik, which investigators used as an identifying indicator.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“The hacker’s user agent was unique. It actually had the word Sputnik in the end”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15579–15659
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
SSH
The hacker accessed the LinkedIn database server using SSH and then ran database queries.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“they did. There were logs of the hacker logging into the database server and then accessing the database”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17858–17963
Formspring breach
INVOLVES
SQL injection or database command execution
The hacker used the web administration panel to execute SQL commands and extract user information from the database.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he was able to run SQL commands on the database and grabbed a large amount of user info”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26034–26121
LinkedIn data breach
INVOLVES
madnez.php
The hacker uploaded and executed a malicious PHP file named madnez.php while compromising the web server.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“he uploaded a couple malicious PHP files. One was specifically called madnez.php”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 5965–6046
LinkedIn data breach
RELATED_TO
Formspring breach
The LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Formspring cases shared indicators of compromise, including IP addresses, user agents, browsers, and operating systems.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“In all three attacks they found similar IOCs, or indicators of compromise; the same IPs, the same user agents, the same browser and OS”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 31578–31712
LinkedIn data breach
RELATED_TO
Dropbox breach
The FBI linked the LinkedIn and Dropbox incidents through matching IP addresses, user agents, and related account activity.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“Someone had breached LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Formspring all from the same IPs and same user agents with a trail connecting it all”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 28935–29063
Federal Bureau of Investigation
USES
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
The FBI used the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process to request Russian subscriber records for suspicious IP addresses.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 86
Details
“the FBI requested from Russia subscriber records through MLAT”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 31227–31288