Threat actor

Magecart

threat_actor:magecart Also: Magecart hacking group

Name originally assigned by RiskIQ to a group compromising Magento sites with payment-skimming JavaScript; later used for multiple related groups.

Explore relationships

Mentioned in

Relationships

Direction Predicate Other entity Origin EP
outgoing DISCOVERED_BY RiskIQ Explicit 52
outgoing USES web skimming Explicit 52
outgoing USES supply-chain compromise Explicit 52
outgoing USES JavaScript Explicit 52
outgoing ASSOCIATED_WITH Magento Explicit 52
incoming PART_OF Magecart Group 2 Derived 52
incoming PART_OF Magecart Group 3 Derived 52
incoming PART_OF Magecart Group 4 Derived 52
incoming ASSOCIATED_WITH British Airways data breach Uncertain 52
incoming ASSOCIATED_WITH Newegg data breach Uncertain 52

Claims

Magecart DISCOVERED_BY RiskIQ

RiskIQ researchers identified and internally named the group Magecart.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jonathan Klijnsma EP 52 Details

“We had to give it a name internally to reference it and at some point, this turned into Magecart.”

Jonathan Klijnsma · offsets 10351–10448

Magecart USES web skimming

Magecart uses web skimming to steal payment data from online checkout pages.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jonathan Klijnsma EP 52 Details

“Web skimming is the go-to thing by now if you want to steal credit card data.”

Jonathan Klijnsma · offsets 18607–18684

Magecart USES supply-chain compromise

Magecart has used compromised third-party or supply-chain resources to place malicious JavaScript on websites.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“the hackers were getting this malicious JavaScript into these sites through the supply chain”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 16324–16416

Magecart USES JavaScript

Magecart skimmers are implemented as small pieces of JavaScript loaded into websites.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jonathan Klijnsma EP 52 Details

“The skimming code is a small piece of JavaScript.”

Jonathan Klijnsma · offsets 10844–10893

Magecart ASSOCIATED_WITH Magento

Magecart originated in activity involving websites running Magento, although the group later expanded beyond Magento.

Explicit Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“the Magecart hacking group initially started as a single group in 2015”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 18822–18892

“not all these sites that are compromised are running Magento. This is just where the term is originated from”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 18327–18436

Magecart Group 2 PART_OF Magecart

Magecart Group 2 is presented as one of the groups tracked under the broader Magecart name.

Derived Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“there’s Magecart hacking Group 2 and Group 3 and Group 4”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19035–19091

Magecart Group 3 PART_OF Magecart

Magecart Group 3 is presented as one of the groups tracked under the broader Magecart name.

Derived Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“there’s Magecart hacking Group 2 and Group 3 and Group 4”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19035–19091

Magecart Group 4 PART_OF Magecart

Magecart Group 4 is presented as one of the groups tracked under the broader Magecart name.

Derived Confidence 88% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“there’s Magecart hacking Group 2 and Group 3 and Group 4”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19035–19091

British Airways data breach ASSOCIATED_WITH Magecart

RiskIQ's findings suggested that the British Airways breach may have involved the same Magecart skimming group or code, but the episode does not establish this as certain.

Uncertain Confidence 86% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“he was able to take this knowledge and searched his database of cashed websites to see if this same group might be hacking another website”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 26713–26851

“the technique that we observed so many times”

Jonathan Klijnsma · offsets 22817–22861

Newegg data breach ASSOCIATED_WITH Magecart

The Newegg breach was associated with the same skimming code and group observed in the British Airways incident, but the episode does not identify the perpetrators with certainty.

Uncertain Confidence 90% · Jack Rhysider EP 52 Details

“They did find the same skimming code on another website. This time, it was on the website newegg.com.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27043–27145

“What happened there was it was another breach.”