Episode

EP 122 — Lisa

23 August 2022 Official episode · Official transcript

social engineering incident response

Lisa Forte discusses maritime piracy, cyber-crisis preparation, insider threats, social engineering through LinkedIn and Facebook, and the need to detect and respond after attackers bypass preventive controls.

Topics: Insider-threat programs, Social engineering through professional and social-media platforms, Malware delivery through fake job offers, Data exfiltration and intellectual-property theft, Open-source intelligence (OSINT), Maritime security and pirate attack response, LRAD and non-lethal acoustic deterrence, Incident response after perimeter controls fail, Employee assistance and insider-threat risk reduction, Nation-state and organised-crime collection operations

Official episode-page sources

Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.

No Sources heading on this episode page.

Entities (33)

Claims (16)

Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.

Lisa Forte MEMBER_OF Red Goat Cyber Security

Lisa Forte says she is a partner at Red Goat Cyber Security.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“I’m a partner at Red Goat Cyber Security”

Lisa Forte · offsets 1479–1519

Red Goat Cyber Security DEVELOPED_BY Lisa Forte

Lisa says she left her prior job and started her own cybersecurity company called Red Goat.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“she left that job and started her own cyber-security company called Red Goat”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 14775–14851

Lisa Forte ASSOCIATED_WITH insider threat

Lisa identifies insider threats as her area of work and says she helps companies develop insider-threat programs.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“insider threats is my sort of area”

Lisa Forte · offsets 40501–40535

piracy in the Horn of Africa INVOLVES insider threat

Lisa says Somali pirates were running insiders in European insurance companies as part of their operations.

Explicit Confidence 94% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“they were running insiders and big insurance companies in Europe”

Lisa Forte · offsets 4579–4643

piracy in the Horn of Africa INVOLVES OSINT

Lisa says Somali pirates conducted OSINT to identify ships and plan attacks.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“they were doing OSINT”

Lisa Forte · offsets 4645–4666

USS Cole attack INVOLVES USS Cole

The USS Cole attack involved the USS Cole, which was damaged by a bomb detonated alongside it.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“a barge came up alongside it and it detonated a bomb right next to it”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8640–8710

USS Cole attack INVOLVES Al-Qaeda

Jack says Al-Qaeda took credit for the USS Cole attack.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“Al-Qaeda took credit for this attack”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7318–7354

LRAD SAME_AS Long-Range Acoustic Device

Jack explicitly expands LRAD as Long-Range Acoustic Device.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“LRAD is an acronym; it stands for Long-Range Acoustic Device”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7890–7950

Think Before You Link DEVELOPED_BY MI5

Lisa says MI5, together with another organization, launched the Think Before You Link campaign.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“MI5 in the UK have – with another organization have launched a Think Before You Link campaign”

Lisa Forte · offsets 25818–25911

Axie Infinity cryptocurrency theft ATTRIBUTED_TO government of North Korea

Jack says the theft was attributed to the government of North Korea.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“This was attributed to be the work of the government of North Korea”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 26922–26989

Axie Infinity cryptocurrency theft TARGETS Axie Infinity

The attackers targeted people who worked at Axie Infinity in order to gain access to the company network.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“They targeted people who worked at Axie Infinity”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27086–27134

Axie Infinity cryptocurrency theft INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA LinkedIn

Jack says the attackers got into Axie Infinity through LinkedIn by enticing employees with job offers.

Attributed Confidence 97% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“the way they got in was through LinkedIn”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27043–27083

Axie Infinity cryptocurrency theft INVOLVES social engineering

The Axie Infinity attack involved enticing employees with job offers and manipulating them into opening a document.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“enticed them with great job offers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27136–27170

Axie Infinity cryptocurrency theft INVOLVES Malware

Jack says opening the document placed malware on an employee's work computer and gave the attackers network access.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“when the employee opened the document, malware was put on their work computer”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27176–27253

government of North Korea USES LinkedIn

Jack presents North Korean hackers as using LinkedIn to socially engineer targets and gain access to companies.

Attributed Confidence 95% · Jack Rhysider EP 122 Details

“nation state-level threat actors are in fact using LinkedIn as a way to social-engineer someone”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27388–27483

City 40 DEVELOPED_BY Soviet Union

Lisa says City 40 was created by the Soviet Union for its nuclear program.

Explicit Direction flagged Confidence 98% · Lisa Forte EP 122 Details

“City 40 which was created by the Soviet Union to create their nuclear program”

Lisa Forte · offsets 42394–42471

Transcript references

Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.

Extraction provenance

Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19 · 2026-09-13T07:41:54.126490+00:00