Episode

EP 35 — Carbanak

02 April 2019 Official episode · Official transcript

cybercrime

The episode covers ATM attacks, Barnaby Jack’s ATM and medical-device research, and the Carbanak campaign targeting banks through phishing, malware, remote access, and fraudulent money transfers.

Topics: ATM jackpotting and physical ATM attacks, ATM firmware modification through USB, Remote ATM access and authentication bypass, Carbanak bank-targeting malware, Phishing through malicious Word documents, Keylogging and credential theft, Screen recording for operational reconnaissance, Domain-controller compromise and lateral movement, Command-and-control infrastructure discovery and seizure, Fraudulent SWIFT transfers, Database manipulation to inflate money-mule account balances, Use of Metasploit and Cobalt Strike, Embedded-device and medical-device security, ATM network interception and fake processing centers, Windows Sticky Keys abuse

Official episode-page sources

Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.

No Sources heading on this episode page.

Entities (56)

Claims (37)

Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.

Dade REFERENCES Exploding the Phone

Dade says he is reading Exploding the Phone, a history of phone phreaking.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Dade EP 35 Details

“I’m reading Exploding the Phone. It’s about phone phreaking, kind of the history of it.”

Dade · offsets 93–181

Dade REFERENCES Hackers

Dade says the film Hackers inspired him to get into computers and influenced his hacker handle.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Dade EP 35 Details

“I picked my hacker handle because of that movie. It’s what inspired me to get into computers in the first place.”

Dade · offsets 1330–1443

Jornt v.d. Wiel MEMBER_OF Kaspersky Lab

Jornt identifies himself as a security researcher within Kaspersky Lab.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“My name is Jornt v.d. Wiel. I’m a security researcher within the Kaspersky Lab.”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 13692–13772

Kaspersky Lab ASSOCIATED_WITH Russia

Jack says Kaspersky Lab is based in Moscow, Russia.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Kaspersky Lab is based in Moscow, Russia”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 13799–13839

ATM remote-login authentication bypass DISCOVERED_BY Barnaby Jack

Barnaby Jack found a vulnerability that bypassed authentication on an ATM remote login.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Barnaby found a [00:10:00] vulnerability in the software to let him bypass that authentication altogether”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10030–10135

ATM remote-login authentication bypass AFFECTS ATM

The authentication-bypass vulnerability affected an ATM's remote-login software.

Derived Confidence 93% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“there was a remote login to the ATM but it had a username and password”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 9953–10023

Barnaby Jack EXPLOITS ATM remote-login authentication bypass

Barnaby used the ATM authentication-bypass vulnerability to gain access without authenticating.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“allowing him to get right into the ATM”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10137–10175

Barnaby Jack USES firmware modification

Barnaby loaded custom firmware to control ATM functions.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“He was able to load a custom firmware onto a USB flash drive.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7748–7809

Barnaby Jack USES ATM jackpotting

Barnaby demonstrated dispensing all cash from an ATM's cassettes, which he called jackpotting.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“The most astonishing thing he could do was dispense all of the cash from all the cassettes which he called jackpotting.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8651–8770

Barnaby Jack USES ATM remote access

Barnaby remotely controlled an ATM after bypassing its remote-login authentication and replacing its firmware.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Barnaby could now remote-control an ATM with his own custom firmware”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10662–10730

Toucan AFFECTS ATM

Toucan was installed on and operated within ATMs running Windows.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“an ATM is just a computer running Windows so it’s possible to install malware on it”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 18099–18182

Toucan USES ATM jackpotting

Toucan provided a menu that allowed an operator to select cassettes and dispense their money.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“you basically get into the god-mode menu because you can choose from which cassettes you want the money”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 18963–19066

Carbanak INVOLVES Carbanak

The campaign was named Carbanak after investigators analyzed the malware used in the operation.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“At this point they decided to give this malware a name and they called it Carbanak.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28237–28320

Carbanak VARIANT_OF Carber

Jornt says Carbanak was based on malware called Carber.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“it was based on malware called Carber”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 28354–28391

Carbanak ASSOCIATED_WITH Anunak

The name Carbanak incorporated the name of an Anunak configuration file.

Explicit Confidence 95% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“there was a configuration file called Anunak”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 28401–28445

Carbanak DISCOVERED_BY Jornt v.d. Wiel

Jornt and his team analyzed the malware and named it Carbanak; Jornt is the identified investigator in the episode.

Derived Confidence 86% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“Jornt and his team have responded to a lot of banks with the same problem. They have a copy of the malware”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 22670–22772

Carbanak INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The campaign initially entered a bank through a phishing email sent to an employee.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“They send a spare phishing e-mail to an employee at the bank”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 28716–28776

Carbanak INVOLVES exploit in patched Word vulnerability

The phishing Word document contained an exploit for a vulnerability that had already been patched.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“that Word document contained an exploit for an already patched vulnerability”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 28850–28926

Carbanak INVOLVES keylogging

The attackers installed a keylogger to capture administrator passwords and other keystrokes.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“The hackers first installed a key logger on this person’s computer to record every keystroke”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 29945–30037

Carbanak INVOLVES privilege escalation

The attackers attempted to elevate privileges by obtaining administrator passwords.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“the next goal would be to elevate their privileges and get access to the domain controller”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 29852–29942

Carbanak INVOLVES lateral movement

After obtaining one administrator password, the attackers reused it on other servers and reached the domain controller.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Now that they have the admin password to one of the computers they’ll try to use that password on another server.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 30720–30833

Carbanak INVOLVES screen recording

The attackers recorded an employee's screen to learn how the bank's IT and money-transfer systems worked.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“install video recording software on the machine of one of the employees”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 31756–31827

Carbanak USES Swift

One cash-out method was entering data directly into the Swift system to transfer money overseas.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“One way was to enter data directly into the Swift system and transfer money overseas.”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 33009–33094

Carbanak INVOLVES ATM remote access

The attackers remotely controlled ATMs through an ATM administration server.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“One other way was to control the ATMs remotely like we saw with the first case.”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 33388–33467

Carbanak INVOLVES ATM jackpotting

The attackers used remote ATM administration to dump all the bills from ATMs.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“they just started dumping all the bills out”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33714–33757

Carbanak USES money mule

The attackers created accounts and debit cards for money mules to withdraw stolen funds.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“They created all these accounts for their money mules.”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 33932–33986

Carbanak USES Metasploit

After Carbanak signatures became known, the attackers switched to the off-the-shelf tool Metasploit.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“they started using off-the-shelf tools such as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36337–36412

Carbanak USES Cobalt Strike

After Carbanak signatures became known, the attackers switched to the off-the-shelf tool Cobalt Strike.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“they started using off-the-shelf tools such as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36337–36412

Carbanak TARGETS Ukraine

The episode says most bank robberies associated with the group occurred in Ukraine and Russia.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“most bank robberies occurred in Ukraine and Russia”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36923–36973

Carbanak TARGETS Russia

The episode says most bank robberies associated with the group occurred in Ukraine and Russia.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“most bank robberies occurred in Ukraine and Russia”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36923–36973

Carbanak TARGETS Spain

The campaign later branched out to countries including Spain.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“it did start to branch out to various other countries like Spain and China”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36974–37048

Carbanak TARGETS China

The campaign later branched out to countries including China.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“it did start to branch out to various other countries like Spain and China”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36974–37048

Carbanak ASSOCIATED_WITH Europol

Europol tracked the group and reported a substantially higher estimate of the number of banks attacked and money stolen.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Europol was also tracking this group and they had completely different numbers.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 36653–36732

Carbanak ASSOCIATED_WITH Dutch police

The Dutch police worked with Kaspersky researchers and seized a command-and-control server connected to the operation.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jornt v.d. Wiel EP 35 Details

“we also decided to work on this case together with the Dutch police”

Jornt v.d. Wiel · offsets 26449–26516

Carbanak ASSOCIATED_WITH FBI

The FBI had a case on the group and shared information with other investigators.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“even the FBI had cases on this group and were sharing information”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 37235–37300

Carbanak ASSOCIATED_WITH Russia

The episode presents the operators as Russian hackers or people fluent in Russian, so the Russian association is not certain.

Uncertain Confidence 84% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“Russian hackers or someone fluent in Russian found their way into a Russian bank’s network”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 32599–32689

Denis K ASSOCIATED_WITH Ukraine

Jack says Denis K was from Ukraine and was arrested in Spain in connection with the operation.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 35 Details

“A guy named Denis K was arrested in Spain. He was from the Ukraine”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 37545–37612

Transcript references

Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.

Extraction provenance

Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19 · 2026-09-13T05:37:12.601720+00:00