Episode

EP 77 — Olympic Destroyer

27 October 2020 Official episode · Official transcript

advanced persistent threat

The episode examines the 2018 cyberattack against the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the Olympic Destroyer malware, its deceptive forensic clues, and the attribution of the attack to Russia’s GRU Unit 74455, also identified as Sandworm.

Topics: Destructive malware and wiper behavior, Malware attribution and forensic analysis, False flags and deceptive malware artifacts, Phishing with malicious Word documents and macros, Password theft and remote-access-based lateral movement, Rich Header forgery, Domain-controller disruption and recovery from backups, Cyberattacks against the Olympic Games, GRU and state-sponsored cyber operations

Official episode-page sources

Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.

Entities (44)

Claims (21)

Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.

Andy Greenberg AUTHORED Sandworm

Andy Greenberg says he is the author of Sandworm, which contains this story.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“I’m still the author of Sandworm because this is a story from Sandworm.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 3369–3440

Olympic Destroyer TARGETS South Korea

The attack targeted the Winter Olympics in South Korea.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“the Winter Olympics in 2018 which was in South Korea”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 3480–3532

Olympic Destroyer INVOLVES winlogon.exe

The Olympic attack involved the malicious file winlogon.exe, which repeatedly wiped systems.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“they’re being wiped again by some piece of malware in their system. They are able to figure out that it’s this one malicious file called winlogon.exe.”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 10290–10441

winlogon.exe SAME_AS Olympic Destroyer

Cisco Talos named the malicious winlogon.exe worm Olympic Destroyer.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“it was Talos that gave this worm a name; Olympic Destroyer.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 17631–17690

Olympic Destroyer AFFECTS Microsoft Windows

Olympic Destroyer disabled Windows services and rendered Windows-based servers unusable.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“disabling all of their Windows services and shutting the computer down so it couldn’t be rebooted”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 18005–18102

Olympic Destroyer AFFECTS Domain controller

The malware repeatedly wiped the Olympic domain controllers.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“they find that as they’re rebuilding domain controllers, for instance, they’re being wiped again by some piece of malware in their system”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 10219–10356

Olympic Destroyer USES wiper

The malware used destructive wiping behavior, deleting data and disabling systems.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“a component that would use those stolen passwords with remote access features to spread among computers and destroy all of the data on them”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 17786–17925

Olympic Destroyer USES lateral movement

The worm used stolen passwords and remote-access features to spread among computers.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“use those stolen passwords with remote access features to spread among computers”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 17809–17889

Olympic Destroyer INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA phishing

The initial infection appears to have begun with phishing emails containing malicious Word documents.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“the initial infection of the Olympic network began with a phishing e-mail”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 26766–26839

phishing USES Malicious Macro Generator

The phishing documents used macros created with the Malicious Macro Generator.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“these macros were created with a tool called Malicious Macro Generator”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27049–27119

Olympic Destroyer INVOLVES false flag

The attack involved numerous false flags and clues pointing toward different countries.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“the hackers, instead of trying to simply cover their tracks, they had built-in tracks pointing in every direction at once”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 21876–21997

Olympic Destroyer ASSOCIATED_WITH Lazarus

Researchers found wiper-code similarities between Olympic Destroyer and malware associated with Lazarus, but the episode presents this as one potentially misleading clue.

Uncertain Confidence 95% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“There were, for instance, code matches with malware from the North Korean group called Lazarus”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 20424–20518

Olympic Destroyer ASSOCIATED_WITH APT3

Intezer reported that part of Olympic Destroyer’s password-stealing code matched APT3, which is described as widely understood to be Chinese.

Attributed Confidence 97% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“Intezer pointed out that a chunk of the password-stealing code in Olympic Destroyer matched with a different hacker group called APT3”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 21230–21363

Olympic Destroyer ASSOCIATED_WITH XData

CrowdStrike found similarities between Olympic Destroyer and the ransomware XData used by Russian hackers.

Attributed Confidence 97% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“CrowdStrike found similarities in parts of Olympic Destroyer with a piece of ransomware that Russian hackers had used called XData”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 21477–21607

Olympic Destroyer DISCOVERED_BY Cisco Talos

Cisco Talos analyzed winlogon.exe and assigned it the name Olympic Destroyer.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“Cisco Talos analyzed winlogon.exe, that malicious file that wiped the computers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 17546–17625

Olympic Destroyer DISCOVERED_BY AhnLab

AhnLab helped isolate the malware and create a signature for it.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“with the help of this Korean security company AhnLab – isolate and create a signature for this automated piece of malware”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 11660–11781

Olympic Destroyer DISCOVERED_BY Igor Sumenkov

Igor Sumenkov identified that the apparent Lazarus Rich Header had been forged.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Andy Greenberg EP 77 Details

“What Igor Sumenkov had found though was that this means someone was trying to make it look like North Korea”

Andy Greenberg · offsets 24437–24544

Olympic Destroyer ATTRIBUTED_TO Sandworm

The episode ultimately identifies Sandworm as the group responsible for the Olympic attack, while earlier forensic clues were deliberately deceptive.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“this was the same group that conducted NotPetya, one of the most extreme cyber-attacks the world has ever seen. This was the hacking group known as Sandworm.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 30636–30794

Olympic Destroyer ATTRIBUTED_TO Russia

The DOJ indictment attributed the Olympic sabotage to officers of Russia’s military intelligence unit 74455.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Doj EP 77 Details

“The defendants in this case were all members of the military unit 74455 of the Russia main intelligence directorate, known as the GRU.”

Doj · offsets 34841–34975

Unit 74455 PART_OF GRU

Unit 74455 is described as a unit of the GRU, Russia’s main intelligence directorate.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Doj EP 77 Details

“military unit 74455 of the Russia main intelligence directorate, known as the GRU”

Doj · offsets 34893–34974

Sandworm ASSOCIATED_WITH Unit 74455

The episode says the Mueller Report identified Unit 74455 as Sandworm; this is presented as the working identification of the group.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 77 Details

“it was the first time we learned that Unit 74455 was Sandworm”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 32101–32162

Transcript references

Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.

Extraction provenance

Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19 · 2026-09-13T06:42:27.785375+00:00