Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
technical support scam
USES
gift-card laundering
Technical-support scammers use gift cards as a payment method and launder the card numbers through secondary markets.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jim Browning
EP 143
Details
“As soon as you read out that number, that’s as good as them taking the value of that card because they can launder that almost immediately”
Jim Browning ·
offsets 10098–10236
technical support scam
USES
social engineering
The scam relies on convincing victims that their computers are infected and manipulating them into following the scammers’ instructions.
Derived
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 143
Details
“They’ll try to convince you that your computer has a virus and they can help”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4024–4100
refund scam
USES
text-to-speech software
Refund scams are described as using text-to-speech software in their robocall or voicemail lures.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 143
Details
“They’re clearly using some text-to-speech software, right?”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 13771–13829
refund scam
USES
HTML manipulation
Refund scammers fake an overpayment by editing the bank webpage displayed in the victim’s browser.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 143
Details
“the scammer just faked the whole transaction by editing the HTML on the victim’s screen”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17912–17999
technical support scam
USES
money mule
Some bank-oriented scams instruct victims to mail cash to an address controlled through a money mule arrangement.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jim Browning
EP 143
Details
“mail your cash to an address, and it’s a money mule address”
Jim Browning ·
offsets 12635–12694
refund scam
USES
remote access software
Refund scammers ask to view and control the victim’s computer through a screen-sharing or remote-access application.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 143
Details
“The scammer will say that they want to make sure the money goes into the proper bank account and will ask to see the victim’s screen by using some screen-sharing application, and then they’ll ask to take control of the victim’s computer”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 17258–17494
Jim Browning
USES
scambaiting
Jim deliberately baits scammers, observes their operations, records the interactions, and exposes them.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 143
Details
“he tries to bait scammers to scam him, and he records it for YouTube”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 2020–2088
Deepfakes
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Voice cloning
The episode connects deepfakes with AI-generated audio and video that can imitate a person’s voice or appearance.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Daniel Miessler
EP 144
Details
“with deepfakes, for both video and audio”
Daniel Miessler ·
offsets 59171–59211
SocialProof Security
DEVELOPED_BY
Rachel Tobac
Rachel says she created SocialProof Security in 2017 after companies began asking her to speak and test their defenses.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“So, I made SocialProof Security in 2017”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 12528–12567
Social Engineering Contest
INVOLVES
social engineering
The contest involved using social-engineering calls to obtain information from a target company.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 144
Details
“get enough information to hack into a company, all through phone calls”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 8115–8185
Social Engineering Contest
INVOLVES
Rachel Tobac
Rachel participated in the social engineering contest and competed for three years.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 144
Details
“Competing three years in a row in the social engineering contest”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11980–12044
Evan
MEMBER_OF
SocialProof Security
Evan is described as the technical half of SocialProof Security and handles technical work for the engagements.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“The other half of SocialProof Security is my husband, Evan. He does all of the technical stuff.”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 23267–23362
Social Engineering Contest
PART_OF
Defcon
The social engineering contest is presented as taking place at Defcon.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 144
Details
“what she was watching was the social engineering contest”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 7988–8044
“she applies to compete again the next year”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 11814–11856
social engineering village
PART_OF
Defcon
The Social Engineering Village is described as one of the villages at Defcon.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 144
Details
“The Social Engineering Village is one of the more popular ones”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 6869–6931
Rachel Tobac
USES
Account takeover
During an authorized bank penetration test, Rachel attempted to take over customer accounts and obtain administrative access.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“my job was to take over multiple accounts and steal access”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 14484–14542
“I have full admin access to the bank account”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 24812–24856
Rachel Tobac
USES
social engineering
Rachel performs social engineering as her professional specialization and in penetration tests.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“I do all the human hacking stuff”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 23363–23395
“I’m one of the best social engineers I’ve ever met”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 3900–3948
Rachel Tobac
USES
phone-number spoofing
Rachel spoofed a bank customer's phone number during the authorized penetration test.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“I spoof my phone number. I make it look like Kelly on the account”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 20417–20482
Rachel Tobac
USES
Phantom applicant attack
Rachel used a job-application and interview process as an attack path to obtain merger-and-acquisition information.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“I was going to apply to their product manager role”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 29362–29412
“I want to attack via the hiring process”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 35001–35040
Rachel Tobac
USES
Open-source intelligence
Rachel uses open-source intelligence and data-broker information to identify phone numbers, personal details, and target information.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“when we’re doing OCINT, open-source intelligence”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 20520–20568
“I can find those pieces of information through OCINT”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 24012–24064
Rachel Tobac
USES
Voice cloning
Rachel cloned Sharyn Alfonsi’s voice and used it in a phone call to Elizabeth as part of an authorized live demonstration.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“I wanted to clone Sharyn’s voice and spoof Sharyn’s phone number”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 49140–49204
“I put her voice into my voice-cloning tool”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 49466–49508
Rachel Tobac
USES
Email spoofing
Rachel describes email, phone, and chat as possible channels for account-takeover testing, but the episode’s successful test used phone-number spoofing rather than email spoofing.
Uncertain
Confidence 70%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“they told me that I could hack via phone call, e-mail, or chat”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 14416–14478
Rachel Tobac
USES
Pretexting
Rachel uses pretexts, including posing as a confused employee, journalist, customer, or job applicant.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“I pretend to be an employee who’s confused, who’s just starting out”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 11226–11293
“I built a fake journalist pretext”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 30476–30509
Rachel Tobac
USES
Knowledge-based authentication
Rachel discusses knowledge-based authentication as an identity-verification method that attackers can find information to defeat; she does not present it as the bank’s preferred method in this test.
Explicit
Confidence 86%
· Rachel Tobac
EP 144
Details
“knowledge-based authentication, things like, what’s your address? What’s the last four digits of your phone number?”
Rachel Tobac ·
offsets 21973–22088
SocialProof Security
USES
social engineering
SocialProof Security provides social-engineering penetration testing and security-awareness work for companies.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 144
Details
“SocialProof Security, which is basically social engineering for hire”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 13982–14050
Oussama Abdullah Kassir
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Abu Hamza
Shannen discovered that Kassir was connected to Abu Hamza.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 145
Details
“she discovered he was connected to Abu Hamza”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 14518–14562