Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Beatdapp USES Anomaly detection

Beatdapp uses many detection models and anomaly-detection methods to identify fraudulent streams and abnormal playback patterns.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“We’re building — we have probably close to 700 models looking for different things”

Andrew Batey · offsets 30602–30684

“they were mostly using rules-based anomaly detection.”

Andrew Batey · offsets 26613–26666

Andrew Batey USES YouTube

Andrew says his group loaded muted YouTube videos into pop-under windows to rapidly increase view counts and reach YouTube's front page.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“We would load it with YouTube videos on mute”

Andrew Batey · offsets 7846–7890

“we could basically break into the algorithm on the front page”

Andrew Batey · offsets 8047–8108

Beatdapp USES Hashing

Beatdapp receives anonymized, hashed streaming data and uses it while avoiding personally identifiable information.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“We’re seeing an anonymized version, generally hashed data”

Andrew Batey · offsets 34271–34328

“we didn’t have any PII ever”

Andrew Batey · offsets 34337–34364

Beatdapp USES Private permission chain

Andrew says the company operated its blockchain as a private permission chain capable of very high transaction throughput.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“10 million transactions per second per region in a private permission chain”

Andrew Batey · offsets 23002–23077

Andrew Batey USES Ad arbitrage

Andrew says his group used ad arbitrage by buying inexpensive traffic while selling higher-priced advertising inventory.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“Another thing we did in the early days was kind of an ad arbitrage.”

Andrew Batey · offsets 6497–6564

“we would be able to sort of print money”

Andrew Batey · offsets 7204–7243

Beatdapp USES Community clustering

Beatdapp uses community-clustering techniques over streaming-service metadata and device characteristics to identify coordinated activity.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“we have all these types of community-clustering techniques”

Andrew Batey · offsets 33767–33825

Beatdapp USES Blockchain

Beatdapp initially used blockchain as the proposed solution for tracking music plays and later built blockchain infrastructure for that purpose.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Andrew Batey EP 171 Details

“we believe blockchain could be a solution”

Andrew Batey · offsets 21956–21997

“we built one of the fastest blockchains in the world”

Andrew Batey · offsets 22929–22981

SuperBox ASSOCIATED_WITH Kimwolf

D3ada55 confirms that SuperBoxes were part of the Kimwolf botnet.

Explicit Confidence 99% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“They were confirmed as part of that botnet.”

D3ada55 · offsets 59821–59864

vSeeBox ASSOCIATED_WITH SuperBox

The vSeeBox exhibited similar characteristics to the SuperBox and communicated with Tencent infrastructure; the episode presents the devices as related.

Explicit Confidence 96% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“it’s also beaconing straight to China via Tencent infrastructure.”

D3ada55 · offsets 46598–46663

“they all start talking to each other.”

D3ada55 · offsets 46749–46786

SuperBox ASSOCIATED_WITH Pre-positioning

Jack speculates that the boxes may be a pre-positioning move, while acknowledging that the final intent is unknown.

Uncertain Confidence 78% · Jack Rhysider EP 172 Details

“It’s possible that all this is just some pre-positioning move of some kind”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 86771–86845

SuperBox ASSOCIATED_WITH BadBox 2.0

D3ada55 identifies the SuperBox as part of what was being called the BadBox botnet, specifically in the BadBox 2.0 context.

Explicit Confidence 97% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“this thing was part of what’s now referred to as the BadBox botnet.”

D3ada55 · offsets 24020–24087

SuperBox ASSOCIATED_WITH Tencent

The SuperBox was observed communicating with Tencent infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 99% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“The first thing it does is call out to Tencent.”

D3ada55 · offsets 8703–8750

SuperBox ASSOCIATED_WITH QQ

D3ada55 identifies the Tencent communication as involving QQ/qq.com.

Explicit Confidence 98% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“Like, in China, yeah, like qq.com.”

D3ada55 · offsets 8800–8834

Magabox ASSOCIATED_WITH SuperBox

The Magabox looked and behaved like the SuperBox, including using a similar app-store and video-app arrangement.

Explicit Confidence 96% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“it looked just like the SuperBox.”

D3ada55 · offsets 48646–48679

“it worked like the other two.”

D3ada55 · offsets 49555–49584

SuperBox DISCOVERED_BY D3ada55

D3ada55 investigated and discovered suspicious behavior in a SuperBox taken from her father’s house.

Derived Confidence 92% · Jack Rhysider EP 172 Details

“D3ada55 discovered something that was like discovering something you weren’t supposed to see”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 5510–5602

SuperBox EXPLOITS SCADA vulnerability

The SuperBox triggered an alert for a SCADA vulnerability, which the episode presents as an attempted SCADA exploit.

Explicit Direction flagged Confidence 93% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“I get a hit in my vulnerability log, like in the threat log on my Palo Alto firewall, and it’s for a SCADA vulnerability.”

D3ada55 · offsets 9703–9824

D3ada55 MEMBER_OF Palo Alto

D3ada55 says she worked at Palo Alto.

Explicit Confidence 98% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“I’ve worked at some of the biggest names in security, so Palo Alto, Google, Apple.”

D3ada55 · offsets 5156–5238

D3ada55 MEMBER_OF CENSUS

D3ada55 says she is a senior sales engineer at CENSUS.

Explicit Confidence 99% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“now I’m over at CENSUS”

D3ada55 · offsets 5301–5323

D3ada55 MEMBER_OF Google

D3ada55 says she worked at Google.

Explicit Confidence 98% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“I’ve worked at some of the biggest names in security, so Palo Alto, Google, Apple.”

D3ada55 · offsets 5156–5238

Kimwolf OPERATED_BY Dort

Jack states that Dort made the Kimwolf botnet and controls the infected SuperBoxes; this is presented as the episode’s account.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Jack Rhysider EP 172 Details

“this guy, Dort, who’s the one who made the Kimwolf botnet, controls the SuperBoxes.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 60283–60366

SuperBox USES SuperBox App Store

The SuperBox requires its own app store instead of the Google Play Store to access its streaming applications.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 172 Details

“install something called the SuperBox App Store.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27473–27521

D3ada55 USES Nmap

D3ada55 suspected that the boxes were using Nmap to scan a Raspberry Pi.

Uncertain Confidence 90% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“are you guys nmapping this little Raspberry Pi in here?”

D3ada55 · offsets 62631–62686

Aisuru-Kimwolf botnet USES DDoS

Cloudflare reportedly identified Aisuru-Kimwolf as the busiest botnet and mitigated more than 2,000 attacks originating from it.

Attributed Confidence 95% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“Cloudflare put out a report that talks about the DDoS statistics for the year for 2025”

D3ada55 · offsets 61435–61521

“over 2,000 attacks they mitigated originating from this botnet”

D3ada55 · offsets 61658–61720

SuperBox USES Android

The SuperBox runs Android rather than Android TV.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 172 Details

“the operating system on this thing is just Android, and not Android TV, just Android.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 19831–19916

D3ada55 USES tcpdump

D3ada55 ran tcpdump on Raspberry Pis while monitoring the boxes’ network activity.

Explicit Confidence 99% · D3ada55 EP 172 Details

“I’ve got tcpdump running on them”

D3ada55 · offsets 62461–62493