Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

Victor USES Shodan

Victor used Shodan to find IPs with MySQL's port open while looking for exposed databases.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 88 Details

“he could just scan the internet or use a website like Shodan”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8855–8915

GDI Foundation USES default credentials

GDI's vulnerability work included finding internet-exposed databases with default credentials.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 88 Details

“databases just left open with default credentials”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 7639–7688

Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure USES Internet-wide vulnerability scanning

DIVD often scans computers in the Netherlands for vulnerabilities.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 88 Details

“they often scan computers in the Netherlands for vulnerabilities”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10429–10493

Victor USES default credentials

Victor tried default usernames and passwords when checking exposed databases.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 88 Details

“he’ll try default usernames and passwords”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 8994–9035

Molerats ASSOCIATED_WITH Hamas

Jack's research leads him to conclude that Molerats is somehow allied with Hamas, but he explicitly says the connection is uncertain.

Uncertain Confidence 72% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“my conclusion is that Molerats is somehow allied with Hamas.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 44146–44206

“I’m not sure to what degree Molerats might be connected with Hamas, if at all.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 44604–44682

Stuxnet ATTRIBUTED_TO Israel

Jack says circumstantial evidence indicates that Israel, along with the United States, was behind Stuxnet; the attribution is not presented as certain.

Uncertain Confidence 75% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“the circumstantial evidence shows that the US and Israel were behind this attack.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 12413–12494

Spark ATTRIBUTED_TO Molerats

Assaf assesses with moderate to high confidence that Molerats was likely behind the campaign in which Spark was discovered; attribution is hedged.

Uncertain Confidence 82% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“you can say that with, I don’t know, moderate to high confidence that it’s likely Molerats who is behind it.”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 45041–45149

in-memory graph processing DEVELOPED_BY Cybereason

Lior describes in-memory graph processing as the technology built as the secret behind Cybereason.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Lior Div EP 89 Details

“This is a in-memory graph processing technology, that this is kind of the secrets behind Cybereason.”

Lior Div · offsets 17076–17176

Malop DEVELOPED_BY Cybereason

Lior says Cybereason invented the Malop, or malicious operation, approach.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Lior Div EP 89 Details

“Basically, we invented the new method and the method is operation-centric. We call it the Malop, the malicious operation approach.”

Lior Div · offsets 15318–15448

Lior Div MEMBER_OF Cybereason

Lior identifies himself as the CEO and co-founder of Cybereason.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Lior Div EP 89 Details

“I’m Lior Div, the CEO and co-founder of Cybereason.”

Lior Div · offsets 1417–1468

Lior Div MEMBER_OF Unit 8200

Lior says he was assigned to and served in Unit 8200 for six years.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“Lior was assigned to work in Unit 8200.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 2590–2629

“After six years in the army, I went to the university.”

Lior Div · offsets 6136–6190

Assaf Dahan MEMBER_OF Nocturnus

Assaf says he heads the Nocturnus Threat Research Team at Cybereason.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“I am heading the Nocturnus Threat Research Team at Cybereason.”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 25361–25423

Nocturnus PART_OF Cybereason

Nocturnus is described as a team inside Cybereason.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“There’s this team inside Cybereason which is called Nocturnus.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 25438–25500

Molerats SAME_AS Gaza Cyber Gang

Jack reports that FireEye calls the group Molerats while Kaspersky calls the same group the Gaza Cyber Gang.

Attributed Confidence 93% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“FireEye calls this group Molerats but Kaspersky calls this same group the Gaza Cyber Gang.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42723–42813

Molerats TARGETS Palestinian Authority

Assaf says the group targeted political figures within the Palestinian Authority.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“they targeted political figures within the Palestinian authority”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 28662–28726

Stuxnet TARGETS Iran

Jack describes Stuxnet as attacking an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“this was an attack on an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in order to thwart their enrichment process.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 11925–12030

Molerats TARGETS Fatah

Jack says reports show Molerats targeting Fatah but not members of Hamas.

Attributed Confidence 91% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“they do target Fatah.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43896–43917

Molerats TARGETS Palestine

The episode describes Molerats as mostly targeting people in Palestine and Israel, including political figures.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“They have mostly targeted people in Palestine and Israel”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43651–43707

Molerats TARGETS Fatah

Assaf says the targeted Palestinian Authority figures were associated with Fatah, and that the group targets political figures and entities in the region.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“political figures within the Palestinian authority that associated with Fatah”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 28676–28753

Stuxnet TARGETS Iran

The Stuxnet attack is described as targeting Iran's nuclear enrichment facility.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 89 Details

“this was an attack on an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 11925–11985

SharpStage USES Data exfiltration

SharpStage uses Dropbox as its method for exfiltrating data.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“the exfiltration method is using a Dropbox client”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 34353–34402

Spark USES Data exfiltration

Spark can be used to steal and harvest information from a victim endpoint.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“They can run different commands, they can use it to steal information”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 31164–31233

“basically harvest any information.”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 31390–31424

DropBook USES Command and control

DropBook implements a command-and-control channel using fake Facebook accounts.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“they actually implemented a C2 communication channel using Facebook fake accounts”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 37333–37414

Molerats USES phishing

Molerats' campaigns are described as sending targeted phishing emails and documents to victims.

Derived Confidence 97% · Assaf Dahan EP 89 Details

“the operators sent a phishing PDF to their victims.”

Assaf Dahan · offsets 33228–33279

“specific individuals were sent these phishing e-mails”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 40192–40245

Cybereason USES in-memory graph processing

Cybereason collects endpoint data and analyzes it in real time using graph processing.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Lior Div EP 89 Details

“over there we’re running the graph processing in real time.”

Lior Div · offsets 49287–49346