Claims
Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached.
These are not independently verified facts.
The Pizza Problem
INVOLVES
OG accounts
The harassment campaign targeted what the episode describes as an OG Instagram account: a short, desirable handle.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 97
Details
“this brings us to the world of OG accounts”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 27600–27643
The Pizza Problem
INVOLVES
AT&T
AT&T was the mobile provider that confirmed Miles’s SIM information had been changed during the first attack.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“you called earlier and you changed your SIM information”
Miles ·
offsets 6503–6558
The Pizza Problem
INVOLVES
Fire-trucking
Miles feared that the harassment could escalate to fire-trucking.
Uncertain
Confidence 91%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“this sort of thing can lead to swatting and fire-trucking”
Miles ·
offsets 25318–25375
Nicole Beckwith
MEMBER_OF
United States Secret Service
Nicole Beckwith was described as having served as a Secret Service task force officer.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 97
Details
“as a Secret Service task force officer”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 38564–38602
Miles
USES
Instagram
Miles maintained and used an Instagram account under his animal handle.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“I had this name on Twitter and Instagram”
Miles ·
offsets 3203–3243
Miles
USES
Facebook
Miles used Facebook with the same online handle.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“then I had it on Dribble and LinkedIn and Facebook”
Miles ·
offsets 3249–3299
Miles
USES
Twitter
Miles maintained and used a Twitter account under his animal handle.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“I had this name on Twitter and Instagram”
Miles ·
offsets 3203–3243
Miles
USES
Internet Crime Complaint Center
Miles filed an online cybercrime report after police suggested reporting the harassment to the FBI; Nicole identifies this reporting channel as IC3.
Attributed
Confidence 84%
· Nicole Beckwith
EP 97
Details
“file a complaint with the – with IC3, the Internet Crime Complaint Center the FBI runs”
Nicole Beckwith ·
offsets 41051–41137
Miles
USES
LinkedIn
Miles used LinkedIn with the same online handle.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Miles
EP 97
Details
“then I had it on Dribble and LinkedIn and Facebook”
Miles ·
offsets 3249–3299
Miles
USES
two-factor authentication
Miles used two-factor authentication on all of his social-media accounts after the attacks.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 97
Details
“He was using two-factor authentication on all his social media accounts”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 18234–18305
zero-day exploit
AFFECTS
iOS
Nicole reports that the going rate for a zero-day exploit capable of remotely entering iOS software was $2.5 million or more.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“the going rate for a zero-day exploit that gets you into an iPhone’s IOS software remotely is $2.5 million”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 22247–22353
Crowdfense
ASSOCIATED_WITH
zero-day exploit
Crowdfense is described as a broker offering millions of dollars for a zero-day capability targeting iOS remotely.
Explicit
Confidence 95%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“I found one broker in researching the book called Crowdfense that now offers even more than that; they offered $3 million for that same capability”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 22364–22510
Beijing Summer Intern
ASSOCIATED_WITH
China
The attack was connected to China, but Nicole says it was still unknown whether the actor was the Chinese military or a contractor.
Uncertain
Confidence 91%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“the Chinese military – we actually still don’t know if it was the military or a contractor – hacked The New York Times”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 2158–2276
RSA
ASSOCIATED_WITH
weak random number generator
A Reuters report indicated that the NSA might have paid RSA to incorporate weak random number generators into security products; Nicole says what happened remains unclear.
Uncertain
Confidence 89%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“it appeared that the NSA might have actually been paying RSA to bake these weak number generators into some of their security products”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 41904–42038
Flame
ATTRIBUTED_TO
Israel
Flame is presented as possibly Israeli, possibly US-Israeli, or possibly solely US; the attribution is not resolved.
Uncertain
Confidence 78%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“that was either US-Israeli or just US or just Israeli”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 38386–38439
zero-day exploit
EXPLOITS
software vulnerability
Jack defines a zero-day exploit as a working exploit involving a software vulnerability unknown to the software maker.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 98
Details
“A zero-day exploit is basically a vulnerability in software that the makers of that software don’t know exists yet.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 9591–9706
National Security Agency
EXPLOITS
weak random number generator
The NSA was able to break through a weak random number generator and allegedly pushed that vulnerable system into commercial products.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“the NSA knew that there was a – that the NSA could break through this essentially weak random number generator”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 41523–41633
Project Gunman
INVOLVES
National Security Agency
Project Gunman was an investigation kicked off by the NSA into suspected Soviet surveillance of US embassy communications.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 98
Details
“This investigation was kicked off by the NSA and was code-named the Gunman Project.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 26245–26328
Project Gunman
INVOLVES
typewriter magnetic recording implant
Project Gunman involved finding a sophisticated typewriter implant containing a tiny magnetometer and recording equipment.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“what they found in that coil was the most sophisticated exploit that we had ever seen. It was a tiny magnetometer”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 28070–28200
Nicole Perlroth
MEMBER_OF
The New York Times
Nicole Perlroth identifies herself as a cybersecurity and digital espionage reporter at The New York Times.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“I am Nicole Perlroth and I am a cyber-security and digital espionage reporter at The New York Times.”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 1618–1718
Tailored Access Operations
PART_OF
National Security Agency
Tailored Access Operations is described as the NSA's hacking unit.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“the top hackers within Tailored Access Operations, the NSA’s hacking unit”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 32904–32977
Flame
RELATED_TO
Stuxnet
Nicole says Flame may have been a precursor to Stuxnet, while presenting the relationship as uncertain.
Uncertain
Confidence 90%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“We discovered Flame, which we believe was maybe the precursor to Stuxnet”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 38312–38384
Beijing Summer Intern
TARGETS
The New York Times
The attacker nicknamed the Beijing Summer Intern entered The New York Times systems and searched for sources.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“we watched the guy we called the Beijing Summer Intern roll into our systems at 10:30 in the morning Beijing time and roll out at 4:30 or 5:00 PM Beijing time in search of our sources”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 2472–2655
Microsoft
USES
bug bounty
Microsoft began offering bug bounties to hackers who reported vulnerabilities.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“They started improving their security and offering bug bounties to hackers who brought this code to them.”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 19040–19145
Flame
USES
Microsoft software update mechanism
Flame exploited Microsoft's software update mechanism while targeting Iranian systems.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Nicole Perlroth
EP 98
Details
“That utilized – that exploited the Microsoft software update mechanism”
Nicole Perlroth ·
offsets 38488–38558