Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

The Pizza Problem INVOLVES OG accounts

The harassment campaign targeted what the episode describes as an OG Instagram account: a short, desirable handle.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 97 Details

“this brings us to the world of OG accounts”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 27600–27643

The Pizza Problem INVOLVES AT&T

AT&T was the mobile provider that confirmed Miles’s SIM information had been changed during the first attack.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Miles EP 97 Details

“you called earlier and you changed your SIM information”

Miles · offsets 6503–6558

The Pizza Problem INVOLVES Fire-trucking

Miles feared that the harassment could escalate to fire-trucking.

Uncertain Confidence 91% · Miles EP 97 Details

“this sort of thing can lead to swatting and fire-trucking”

Miles · offsets 25318–25375

Nicole Beckwith MEMBER_OF United States Secret Service

Nicole Beckwith was described as having served as a Secret Service task force officer.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 97 Details

“as a Secret Service task force officer”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 38564–38602

Miles USES Instagram

Miles maintained and used an Instagram account under his animal handle.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Miles EP 97 Details

“I had this name on Twitter and Instagram”

Miles · offsets 3203–3243

Miles USES Facebook

Miles used Facebook with the same online handle.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Miles EP 97 Details

“then I had it on Dribble and LinkedIn and Facebook”

Miles · offsets 3249–3299

Miles USES Twitter

Miles maintained and used a Twitter account under his animal handle.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Miles EP 97 Details

“I had this name on Twitter and Instagram”

Miles · offsets 3203–3243

Miles USES Internet Crime Complaint Center

Miles filed an online cybercrime report after police suggested reporting the harassment to the FBI; Nicole identifies this reporting channel as IC3.

Attributed Confidence 84% · Nicole Beckwith EP 97 Details

“file a complaint with the – with IC3, the Internet Crime Complaint Center the FBI runs”

Nicole Beckwith · offsets 41051–41137

Miles USES LinkedIn

Miles used LinkedIn with the same online handle.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Miles EP 97 Details

“then I had it on Dribble and LinkedIn and Facebook”

Miles · offsets 3249–3299

Miles USES two-factor authentication

Miles used two-factor authentication on all of his social-media accounts after the attacks.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 97 Details

“He was using two-factor authentication on all his social media accounts”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 18234–18305

zero-day exploit AFFECTS iOS

Nicole reports that the going rate for a zero-day exploit capable of remotely entering iOS software was $2.5 million or more.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“the going rate for a zero-day exploit that gets you into an iPhone’s IOS software remotely is $2.5 million”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 22247–22353

Crowdfense ASSOCIATED_WITH zero-day exploit

Crowdfense is described as a broker offering millions of dollars for a zero-day capability targeting iOS remotely.

Explicit Confidence 95% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“I found one broker in researching the book called Crowdfense that now offers even more than that; they offered $3 million for that same capability”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 22364–22510

Beijing Summer Intern ASSOCIATED_WITH China

The attack was connected to China, but Nicole says it was still unknown whether the actor was the Chinese military or a contractor.

Uncertain Confidence 91% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“the Chinese military – we actually still don’t know if it was the military or a contractor – hacked The New York Times”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 2158–2276

RSA ASSOCIATED_WITH weak random number generator

A Reuters report indicated that the NSA might have paid RSA to incorporate weak random number generators into security products; Nicole says what happened remains unclear.

Uncertain Confidence 89% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“it appeared that the NSA might have actually been paying RSA to bake these weak number generators into some of their security products”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 41904–42038

Flame ATTRIBUTED_TO Israel

Flame is presented as possibly Israeli, possibly US-Israeli, or possibly solely US; the attribution is not resolved.

Uncertain Confidence 78% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“that was either US-Israeli or just US or just Israeli”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 38386–38439

zero-day exploit EXPLOITS software vulnerability

Jack defines a zero-day exploit as a working exploit involving a software vulnerability unknown to the software maker.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 98 Details

“A zero-day exploit is basically a vulnerability in software that the makers of that software don’t know exists yet.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 9591–9706

National Security Agency EXPLOITS weak random number generator

The NSA was able to break through a weak random number generator and allegedly pushed that vulnerable system into commercial products.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“the NSA knew that there was a – that the NSA could break through this essentially weak random number generator”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 41523–41633

Project Gunman INVOLVES National Security Agency

Project Gunman was an investigation kicked off by the NSA into suspected Soviet surveillance of US embassy communications.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 98 Details

“This investigation was kicked off by the NSA and was code-named the Gunman Project.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 26245–26328

Project Gunman INVOLVES typewriter magnetic recording implant

Project Gunman involved finding a sophisticated typewriter implant containing a tiny magnetometer and recording equipment.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“what they found in that coil was the most sophisticated exploit that we had ever seen. It was a tiny magnetometer”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 28070–28200

Nicole Perlroth MEMBER_OF The New York Times

Nicole Perlroth identifies herself as a cybersecurity and digital espionage reporter at The New York Times.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“I am Nicole Perlroth and I am a cyber-security and digital espionage reporter at The New York Times.”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 1618–1718

Tailored Access Operations PART_OF National Security Agency

Tailored Access Operations is described as the NSA's hacking unit.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“the top hackers within Tailored Access Operations, the NSA’s hacking unit”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 32904–32977

Flame RELATED_TO Stuxnet

Nicole says Flame may have been a precursor to Stuxnet, while presenting the relationship as uncertain.

Uncertain Confidence 90% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“We discovered Flame, which we believe was maybe the precursor to Stuxnet”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 38312–38384

Beijing Summer Intern TARGETS The New York Times

The attacker nicknamed the Beijing Summer Intern entered The New York Times systems and searched for sources.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“we watched the guy we called the Beijing Summer Intern roll into our systems at 10:30 in the morning Beijing time and roll out at 4:30 or 5:00 PM Beijing time in search of our sources”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 2472–2655

Microsoft USES bug bounty

Microsoft began offering bug bounties to hackers who reported vulnerabilities.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“They started improving their security and offering bug bounties to hackers who brought this code to them.”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 19040–19145

Flame USES Microsoft software update mechanism

Flame exploited Microsoft's software update mechanism while targeting Iranian systems.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Nicole Perlroth EP 98 Details

“That utilized – that exploited the Microsoft software update mechanism”

Nicole Perlroth · offsets 38488–38558