Claims

Qualified triples from the transcripts. Origin, speaker, and evidence stay attached. These are not independently verified facts.

APT10 ATTRIBUTED_TO China

The indictment identifies the hackers as associated with the Chinese government, while the specific allegations are attributed to the US Department of Justice.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“two hackers associated with the Chinese government”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40044–40094

Cloud Hopper ATTRIBUTED_TO APT10

The US Department of Justice indictment alleges that the defendants worked for a group known to cybersecurity experts as APT10.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“The indictment alleges that the defendants work for a group known to cyber-security experts as APT10.”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40638–40739

Cloud Hopper COMPROMISES Domain controller

The attackers gained full administrator access to the customer’s domain controller.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they got into the domain controller of this network and had full admin access there”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34561–34644

Cloud Hopper COMPROMISES Managed Service Provider

The campaign compromised MSP infrastructure and used it to reach multiple customers.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40263–40353

Mimikatz EXPLOITS Windows password handling flaw

Mimikatz extracts passwords from Windows memory where clear-text credentials may be cached.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“Windows has a major flaw in the way it handles passwords.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15421–15478

“Mimikatz is a tool that goes to the exact spot in memory and grabs the password”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15667–15746

Cloud Hopper INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA Remote Desktop

The investigated server was initially accessed through Remote Desktop with a stolen MSP employee account.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“They logged into it and put the malware on.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28606–28649

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES lateral movement

The attackers used stolen credentials to pivot and traverse to other systems, including the domain controller.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“started pivoting and traversing to other systems in the network”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34486–34549

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Sabre

Reuters reportedly listed Sabre among customers affected by the compromised service providers.

Attributed Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“the travel reservation service Sabre”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43217–43253

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES keylogger

Keyloggers were found on MSP jump servers and could capture credentials for multiple customers.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“we know that they found key loggers on the jump servers at the MSP’s site”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 23720–23790

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES jump server

A customer MSP jump server was compromised and communicated with command-and-control infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“this jump server that was reaching out to a known command and control server”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10407–10483

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES IBM

Reuters journalists reportedly identified IBM as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise, IBM, Fujitsu”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42779–42831

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Hewlett Packard Enterprise

Reuters journalists reportedly identified Hewlett Packard Enterprise as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“seven different service providers were compromised, and they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42723–42817

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Swedish Security Service

The campaign investigation began after the Swedish Security Service notified the victim about communications with a command-and-control server.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they had been contacted by the Swedish Security Service because one of the systems had been talking to a command and control server”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4070–4185

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Fujitsu

Reuters journalists reportedly identified Fujitsu as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“IBM, Fujitsu, TADA Consultancy”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42819–42849

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES network scanning

The attackers scanned public IP ranges, including ranges belonging to the US Department of Defense, for shared network drives.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“nineteen of those public IP ranges belonged to the US Department of Defense”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 31827–31902

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES PlugX

The attackers later installed PlugX on the compromised server.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they brought in a known malware called PlugX”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33703–33747

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Ericsson

Reuters reportedly listed Ericsson among customers affected by the compromised service providers.

Attributed Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“the telecom giant Ericsson”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43164–43190

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES credential dumping

After entering the network, the attackers ran Mimikatz to collect credentials.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“it was then when Mimikatz was run where they grabbed all the credentials”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34409–34481

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES DLL side-loading

The attackers used DLL side-loading implants to execute malware through legitimate software binaries.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“We found three more instances of DLL side-loading implants”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 25207–25265

Fabio Viggiani MEMBER_OF Truesec

Fabio Viggiani says he is an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“I’m an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 2462–2531

APT10 TARGETS United States Navy

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Navy and stole personal information from over 100,000 Navy personnel.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“The defendant’s hacking campaigns also targeted US government agencies”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41701–41771

“from over 100,000 Navy personnel”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41977–42009

Cloud Hopper TARGETS United States Department of Defense

The campaign scanned DoD address ranges and was ultimately associated with efforts to reach US government networks.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“This threat actor was using this server and this company’s network to scan the US Department of Defense’s servers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 31937–32050

APT10 TARGETS United States Department of Energy

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Department of Energy.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“the laboratories of NASA, the United States Department of Energy, and the US Navy”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41782–41863

Cloud Hopper TARGETS Managed Service Provider

The campaign targeted MSPs because they had trusted access to customer networks and data.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40263–40353

APT10 TARGETS NASA

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted NASA laboratories.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“targeted US government agencies including the laboratories of NASA”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41740–41806