Episode
EP 103 — Cloud Hopper
26 October 2021
Official episode
·
Official transcript
cybercrime
incident response
The episode describes an MSP-compromise campaign attributed in later US indictments to APT10, involving credential theft, DLL side-loading, PlugX, and attempts to reach US government networks through MSP customers.
Topics: Managed service provider compromise, Jump-server abuse, Command-and-control communications, Credential dumping with Mimikatz, Clear-text credentials in Windows memory, DLL side-loading, Encrypted payload loading and in-memory execution, Remote Desktop access, NetBIOS and NBTscan network scanning, Keylogging, Active Directory compromise and password reset, Lateral movement, Advanced persistent threats, Supply-chain compromise through IT service providers, Digital forensics and memory analysis, Endpoint detection and response
Official episode-page sources
Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.
Entities (54)
Claims (35)
Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.
Fabio Viggiani
MEMBER_OF
Truesec
Fabio Viggiani says he is an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“I’m an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 2462–2531
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
Swedish Security Service
The campaign investigation began after the Swedish Security Service notified the victim about communications with a command-and-control server.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“they had been contacted by the Swedish Security Service because one of the systems had been talking to a command and control server”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 4070–4185
Managed Service Provider
USES
Virtual Private Network
The MSP used a VPN to access a jump server and then reach systems in the customer network.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“they set up a VPN to a server that they could use to jump off of when they needed to get in this network”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10091–10195
Managed Service Provider
USES
jump server
The MSP used jump servers to manage and access customer systems.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“it was one of the jump servers that the MSP used to manage this customer”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 9334–9406
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
jump server
A customer MSP jump server was compromised and communicated with command-and-control infrastructure.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“this jump server that was reaching out to a known command and control server”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 10407–10483
Cloud Hopper
USES
Mimikatz
The attackers ran Mimikatz on the jump server and obtained nearly one hundred clear-text credentials, including Active Directory administrators.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“including several Active Directory domain administrators”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 16698–16754
“It was called thehostingoftheserver.mimikatz.hash.”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 15204–15254
Mimikatz
EXPLOITS
Windows password handling flaw
Mimikatz extracts passwords from Windows memory where clear-text credentials may be cached.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“Windows has a major flaw in the way it handles passwords.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15421–15478
“Mimikatz is a tool that goes to the exact spot in memory and grabs the password”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 15667–15746
Mimikatz
USES
credential dumping
Mimikatz was used to dump usernames and passwords from the compromised system.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“Mimikatz found a lot of passwords”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 16950–16983
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
DLL side-loading
The attackers used DLL side-loading implants to execute malware through legitimate software binaries.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“We found three more instances of DLL side-loading implants”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 25207–25265
Cloud Hopper
USES
Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner
A legitimate Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner binary was used in the DLL side-loading mechanism and connected to command-and-control infrastructure.
Explicit
Confidence 97%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“The name of the process was vba32arkit.exe”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 21558–21600
“turned out to be a legitimate software called Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 21707–21778
Cloud Hopper
USES
NBTscan
The attackers used NBTscan to scan public IP ranges for NetBIOS file-sharing connections.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“It was a legitimate tool called NBTscan. It’s a NetBIOS main network scanner.”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 19170–19245
NBTscan
USES
NetBIOS
NBTscan was used as a NetBIOS network scanner.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“NBTscan. It’s a NetBIOS main network scanner.”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 30905–30951
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
network scanning
The attackers scanned public IP ranges, including ranges belonging to the US Department of Defense, for shared network drives.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“nineteen of those public IP ranges belonged to the US Department of Defense”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 31827–31902
Cloud Hopper
TARGETS
United States Department of Defense
The campaign scanned DoD address ranges and was ultimately associated with efforts to reach US government networks.
Explicit
Confidence 98%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“This threat actor was using this server and this company’s network to scan the US Department of Defense’s servers”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 31937–32050
Cloud Hopper
USES
Remote Desktop
The malware was placed on the server after an attacker logged in through Remote Desktop using stolen credentials.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“someone simply logged into this computer normally, through Remote Desktop, and put it there”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 28397–28488
Cloud Hopper
INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA
Remote Desktop
The investigated server was initially accessed through Remote Desktop with a stolen MSP employee account.
Explicit
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“They logged into it and put the malware on.”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 28606–28649
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
PlugX
The attackers later installed PlugX on the compromised server.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“they brought in a known malware called PlugX”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 33703–33747
PlugX
VARIANT_OF
Remote access Trojan
Fabio identifies PlugX as a known remote access trojan.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Fabio Viggiani
EP 103
Details
“PlugX is a known RAT”
Fabio Viggiani ·
offsets 33756–33776
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
credential dumping
After entering the network, the attackers ran Mimikatz to collect credentials.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“it was then when Mimikatz was run where they grabbed all the credentials”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 34409–34481
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
lateral movement
The attackers used stolen credentials to pivot and traverse to other systems, including the domain controller.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“started pivoting and traversing to other systems in the network”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 34486–34549
Cloud Hopper
COMPROMISES
Domain controller
The attackers gained full administrator access to the customer’s domain controller.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“they got into the domain controller of this network and had full admin access there”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 34561–34644
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
keylogger
Keyloggers were found on MSP jump servers and could capture credentials for multiple customers.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“we know that they found key loggers on the jump servers at the MSP’s site”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 23720–23790
Cloud Hopper
COMPROMISES
Managed Service Provider
The campaign compromised MSP infrastructure and used it to reach multiple customers.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rod Rosenstein
EP 103
Details
“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”
Rod Rosenstein ·
offsets 40263–40353
Cloud Hopper
TARGETS
Managed Service Provider
The campaign targeted MSPs because they had trusted access to customer networks and data.
Explicit
Confidence 99%
· Rod Rosenstein
EP 103
Details
“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”
Rod Rosenstein ·
offsets 40263–40353
Cloud Hopper
ATTRIBUTED_TO
APT10
The US Department of Justice indictment alleges that the defendants worked for a group known to cybersecurity experts as APT10.
Attributed
Confidence 99%
· Rod Rosenstein
EP 103
Details
“The indictment alleges that the defendants work for a group known to cyber-security experts as APT10.”
Rod Rosenstein ·
offsets 40638–40739
APT10
ASSOCIATED_WITH
Ministry of State Security
The defendants associated with APT10 were alleged to have committed the crimes in association with China’s Ministry of State Security.
Attributed
Confidence 98%
· Rod Rosenstein
EP 103
Details
“The defendants allegedly committed these crimes in association with a Chinese intelligence agency known as the Ministry of State Security.”
Rod Rosenstein ·
offsets 41311–41449
APT10
ATTRIBUTED_TO
China
The indictment identifies the hackers as associated with the Chinese government, while the specific allegations are attributed to the US Department of Justice.
Attributed
Confidence 98%
· Rod Rosenstein
EP 103
Details
“two hackers associated with the Chinese government”
Rod Rosenstein ·
offsets 40044–40094
APT10
TARGETS
NASA
The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted NASA laboratories.
Attributed
Confidence 99%
· Jeffrey Burman
EP 103
Details
“targeted US government agencies including the laboratories of NASA”
Jeffrey Burman ·
offsets 41740–41806
APT10
TARGETS
United States Department of Energy
The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Department of Energy.
Attributed
Confidence 99%
· Jeffrey Burman
EP 103
Details
“the laboratories of NASA, the United States Department of Energy, and the US Navy”
Jeffrey Burman ·
offsets 41782–41863
APT10
TARGETS
United States Navy
The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Navy and stole personal information from over 100,000 Navy personnel.
Attributed
Confidence 99%
· Jeffrey Burman
EP 103
Details
“The defendant’s hacking campaigns also targeted US government agencies”
Jeffrey Burman ·
offsets 41701–41771
“from over 100,000 Navy personnel”
Jeffrey Burman ·
offsets 41977–42009
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Reuters journalists reportedly identified Hewlett Packard Enterprise as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.
Attributed
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“seven different service providers were compromised, and they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 42723–42817
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
IBM
Reuters journalists reportedly identified IBM as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.
Attributed
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise, IBM, Fujitsu”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 42779–42831
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
Fujitsu
Reuters journalists reportedly identified Fujitsu as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.
Attributed
Confidence 96%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“IBM, Fujitsu, TADA Consultancy”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 42819–42849
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
Ericsson
Reuters reportedly listed Ericsson among customers affected by the compromised service providers.
Attributed
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“the telecom giant Ericsson”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 43164–43190
Cloud Hopper
INVOLVES
Sabre
Reuters reportedly listed Sabre among customers affected by the compromised service providers.
Attributed
Confidence 94%
· Jack Rhysider
EP 103
Details
“the travel reservation service Sabre”
Jack Rhysider ·
offsets 43217–43253
Transcript references
Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.
Mr. Robot
video
Reuters article about MSP compromises
article · Jack Stubbs; Joseph Menn; Christopher Bing
Darknet Diaries
podcast · Jack Rhysider
Patreon
website
Extraction provenance
Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19
· 2026-09-13T07:19:40.896704+00:00