Episode

EP 103 — Cloud Hopper

26 October 2021 Official episode · Official transcript

cybercrime incident response

The episode describes an MSP-compromise campaign attributed in later US indictments to APT10, involving credential theft, DLL side-loading, PlugX, and attempts to reach US government networks through MSP customers.

Topics: Managed service provider compromise, Jump-server abuse, Command-and-control communications, Credential dumping with Mimikatz, Clear-text credentials in Windows memory, DLL side-loading, Encrypted payload loading and in-memory execution, Remote Desktop access, NetBIOS and NBTscan network scanning, Keylogging, Active Directory compromise and password reset, Lateral movement, Advanced persistent threats, Supply-chain compromise through IT service providers, Digital forensics and memory analysis, Endpoint detection and response

Official episode-page sources

Links published on the Darknet Diaries episode page. Not LLM output.

Entities (54)

Claims (35)

Qualified statements from this episode, not graph facts.

Fabio Viggiani MEMBER_OF Truesec

Fabio Viggiani says he is an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“I’m an incident responder, threat analyst, and red teamer at Truesec.”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 2462–2531

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Swedish Security Service

The campaign investigation began after the Swedish Security Service notified the victim about communications with a command-and-control server.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they had been contacted by the Swedish Security Service because one of the systems had been talking to a command and control server”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 4070–4185

Managed Service Provider USES Virtual Private Network

The MSP used a VPN to access a jump server and then reach systems in the customer network.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they set up a VPN to a server that they could use to jump off of when they needed to get in this network”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10091–10195

Managed Service Provider USES jump server

The MSP used jump servers to manage and access customer systems.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“it was one of the jump servers that the MSP used to manage this customer”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 9334–9406

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES jump server

A customer MSP jump server was compromised and communicated with command-and-control infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“this jump server that was reaching out to a known command and control server”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 10407–10483

Cloud Hopper USES Mimikatz

The attackers ran Mimikatz on the jump server and obtained nearly one hundred clear-text credentials, including Active Directory administrators.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“including several Active Directory domain administrators”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 16698–16754

“It was called thehostingoftheserver.mimikatz.hash.”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 15204–15254

Mimikatz EXPLOITS Windows password handling flaw

Mimikatz extracts passwords from Windows memory where clear-text credentials may be cached.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“Windows has a major flaw in the way it handles passwords.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15421–15478

“Mimikatz is a tool that goes to the exact spot in memory and grabs the password”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 15667–15746

Mimikatz USES credential dumping

Mimikatz was used to dump usernames and passwords from the compromised system.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“Mimikatz found a lot of passwords”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 16950–16983

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES DLL side-loading

The attackers used DLL side-loading implants to execute malware through legitimate software binaries.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“We found three more instances of DLL side-loading implants”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 25207–25265

Cloud Hopper USES Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner

A legitimate Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner binary was used in the DLL side-loading mechanism and connected to command-and-control infrastructure.

Explicit Confidence 97% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“The name of the process was vba32arkit.exe”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 21558–21600

“turned out to be a legitimate software called Vba32 AntiRootkit Scanner”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 21707–21778

Cloud Hopper USES NBTscan

The attackers used NBTscan to scan public IP ranges for NetBIOS file-sharing connections.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“It was a legitimate tool called NBTscan. It’s a NetBIOS main network scanner.”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 19170–19245

NBTscan USES NetBIOS

NBTscan was used as a NetBIOS network scanner.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“NBTscan. It’s a NetBIOS main network scanner.”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 30905–30951

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES network scanning

The attackers scanned public IP ranges, including ranges belonging to the US Department of Defense, for shared network drives.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“nineteen of those public IP ranges belonged to the US Department of Defense”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 31827–31902

Cloud Hopper TARGETS United States Department of Defense

The campaign scanned DoD address ranges and was ultimately associated with efforts to reach US government networks.

Explicit Confidence 98% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“This threat actor was using this server and this company’s network to scan the US Department of Defense’s servers”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 31937–32050

Cloud Hopper USES Remote Desktop

The malware was placed on the server after an attacker logged in through Remote Desktop using stolen credentials.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“someone simply logged into this computer normally, through Remote Desktop, and put it there”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28397–28488

Cloud Hopper INITIAL_ACCESS_VIA Remote Desktop

The investigated server was initially accessed through Remote Desktop with a stolen MSP employee account.

Explicit Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“They logged into it and put the malware on.”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 28606–28649

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES PlugX

The attackers later installed PlugX on the compromised server.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they brought in a known malware called PlugX”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 33703–33747

PlugX VARIANT_OF Remote access Trojan

Fabio identifies PlugX as a known remote access trojan.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Fabio Viggiani EP 103 Details

“PlugX is a known RAT”

Fabio Viggiani · offsets 33756–33776

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES credential dumping

After entering the network, the attackers ran Mimikatz to collect credentials.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“it was then when Mimikatz was run where they grabbed all the credentials”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34409–34481

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES lateral movement

The attackers used stolen credentials to pivot and traverse to other systems, including the domain controller.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“started pivoting and traversing to other systems in the network”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34486–34549

Cloud Hopper COMPROMISES Domain controller

The attackers gained full administrator access to the customer’s domain controller.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they got into the domain controller of this network and had full admin access there”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 34561–34644

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES keylogger

Keyloggers were found on MSP jump servers and could capture credentials for multiple customers.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“we know that they found key loggers on the jump servers at the MSP’s site”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 23720–23790

Cloud Hopper COMPROMISES Managed Service Provider

The campaign compromised MSP infrastructure and used it to reach multiple customers.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40263–40353

Cloud Hopper TARGETS Managed Service Provider

The campaign targeted MSPs because they had trusted access to customer networks and data.

Explicit Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“the defendants are accused of targeting and compromising Managed Service Providers or MSPs”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40263–40353

Cloud Hopper ATTRIBUTED_TO APT10

The US Department of Justice indictment alleges that the defendants worked for a group known to cybersecurity experts as APT10.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“The indictment alleges that the defendants work for a group known to cyber-security experts as APT10.”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40638–40739

APT10 ASSOCIATED_WITH Ministry of State Security

The defendants associated with APT10 were alleged to have committed the crimes in association with China’s Ministry of State Security.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“The defendants allegedly committed these crimes in association with a Chinese intelligence agency known as the Ministry of State Security.”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 41311–41449

APT10 ATTRIBUTED_TO China

The indictment identifies the hackers as associated with the Chinese government, while the specific allegations are attributed to the US Department of Justice.

Attributed Confidence 98% · Rod Rosenstein EP 103 Details

“two hackers associated with the Chinese government”

Rod Rosenstein · offsets 40044–40094

APT10 TARGETS NASA

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted NASA laboratories.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“targeted US government agencies including the laboratories of NASA”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41740–41806

APT10 TARGETS United States Department of Energy

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Department of Energy.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“the laboratories of NASA, the United States Department of Energy, and the US Navy”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41782–41863

APT10 TARGETS United States Navy

The US attorney said APT10 hacking campaigns targeted the US Navy and stole personal information from over 100,000 Navy personnel.

Attributed Confidence 99% · Jeffrey Burman EP 103 Details

“The defendant’s hacking campaigns also targeted US government agencies”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41701–41771

“from over 100,000 Navy personnel”

Jeffrey Burman · offsets 41977–42009

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Hewlett Packard Enterprise

Reuters journalists reportedly identified Hewlett Packard Enterprise as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“seven different service providers were compromised, and they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42723–42817

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES IBM

Reuters journalists reportedly identified IBM as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“they listed Hewlett Packard Enterprise, IBM, Fujitsu”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42779–42831

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Fujitsu

Reuters journalists reportedly identified Fujitsu as one of seven compromised service providers in the campaign.

Attributed Confidence 96% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“IBM, Fujitsu, TADA Consultancy”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 42819–42849

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Ericsson

Reuters reportedly listed Ericsson among customers affected by the compromised service providers.

Attributed Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“the telecom giant Ericsson”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43164–43190

Cloud Hopper INVOLVES Sabre

Reuters reportedly listed Sabre among customers affected by the compromised service providers.

Attributed Confidence 94% · Jack Rhysider EP 103 Details

“the travel reservation service Sabre”

Jack Rhysider · offsets 43217–43253

Transcript references

Works mentioned in the transcript. Distinct from show-note sources.

Extraction provenance

Model gpt-5.6-luna · prompt 1.5.19 · schema 1.5.19 · 2026-09-13T07:19:40.896704+00:00